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Abstract
As instances of corporate wrongdoing continue to rise globally, the opportunity and need
for individual whistleblowers to act as a check on corporate power are also rising.
Whistleblowing efforts represent a unique challenge to the power asymmetry that exists
between an individual employee and the organization. Due to the serious, pervasive harm
to employees and consumers that can stem from organizational misconduct, efforts to
identify indicators of whistleblowing likelihood can potentially provide a significant
means of prevention. This study used a vignette method to present two different levels of
harm occurrence, by manipulating the timing of the consequences of a hypothetical and
specific type of organizational wrongdoing. This was done to strengthen the causal
inferences between the urgency to address the wrongdoing and whistleblowing
likelihood. Across the two levels of harm, I anticipated that individual differences would
be more pronounced in the highly ambiguous situation and would dissipate in the less
ambiguous situation. Building on past research that found positive relationships between
personality traits and both whistleblowing likelihood (Brink et al., 2015) and
whistleblowing behavior (Bjørkelo et al., 2010), I predicted that two personality attributes
of potential whistleblowers —agreeableness and conscientiousness— would moderate
this relationship. A sample of 250 participants was recruited using the crowdsourcing
platform, Prolific. To analyze the data, I ran several moderated multiple regressions to
determine whether personality moderates the relationship between the occurrence of
organizational misconduct and whistleblowing likelihood. The results indicated that
agreeableness did not moderate the relationship between organizational misconduct and
internal whistleblowing (IWB) preferences (Bharm occurrence*agreeableness = -.14, p = .54), or
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between misconduct and external whistleblowing (EWB) preferences (Bharm
occurrence*agreeableness

= -.07, p = .73). Similarly, conscientiousness did not moderate this

relationship for IWB (Bharm occurrence*conscientiousness= .04, p = .82) or for EWB
whistleblowing (Bharm occurrence*conscientiousness = -.03, p = .88). However, significant bivariate
correlations were identified between both personality traits and IWB preferences (i.e., for
agreeableness: r = .19, p =.003; and for conscientiousness: r = .23, p < .001). Practical
implications stemming from the findings are discussed, including identifying the
characteristics of individuals who are more sensitive to wrongdoing behavior and are
willing to shoulder personal risk to stymie its deleterious consequences to human welfare.
Finally, limitations of the current study are addressed along with a presentation of future
directions for the scientific study of the relatively rare phenomenon of whistleblowing.
Keywords: whistleblowing, whistleblowing likelihood, organizational
misconduct
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
Organizations have evolved to a state of unprecedented power and influence with
modern society (Roach, 2007), thereby expanding the potential for them to engage in
varying forms of misconduct. Unfortunately, the incentives for doing so are vast and are
facilitated by a wide array of facilitating systems and stakeholders (Schnatterly et al.,
2018; Smith-Crowe & Warren, 2014). The prevalence of organizational misconduct has
become so commonplace that Anand et al. (2004) theorized that many employees within
these organizations have become relatively desensitized, allowing it to continue through
the combined processes of rationalization and socialization.
Fortunately, organizational misconduct has also been countered by individuals
willing to accept a high level of personal risk and well-being to expose the misconduct.
Within the past decade, polarizing figures such as Edward Snowden and Julian Assange
have demonstrated the power of a single actor to bring to light the harmful practices of
some of the largest and most powerful organizations in the world (Schultz &
Harutyunyan, 2015). Employees are becoming empowered to engage in whistleblowing
behavior with government leaks increasing threefold under the Trump Administration in
the US (Savage & Sullivan, 2017), and increased whistleblowing abroad (Freshﬁelds
Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, 2017).
Whistleblowers are a unique phenomenon, as they not only possess the ability to
expose misconduct; but in some cases, prevent future harm to human wellbeing from
occurring. The possibility of harm reduction represented the underlying motivation for
this study and underscored the need for further understanding of not only why individuals

2
WHISTLEBLOWING INTENTIONS
choose to whistleblow, but when they choose to do so. To illustrate the tremendous
potential for harm reduction through effective whistleblowing, two salient cases are
presented below. In both instances, a whistleblower, who was especially sensitive to
wrongdoing at its onset, could have prevented substantial harm to millions of people.
The first case involved whistleblower Katharine Gun, who was an employee of
the British intelligence unit, the Government Communication Headquarters (GCHQ) in
2003. She discovered a memo between the United States National Security Agency
(NSA) and the GCHQ, requesting assistance in surveilling United Nations (UN) officials’
telecommunications. The purpose of this surveillance was reportedly to gain a strategic
advantage in the effort to gain UN security council approval for the Iraq invasion. Gun
subsequently leaked this memo to the press, exposing the operation at considerable risk to
both herself and her family. Although the Iraq invasion did ultimately take place, Gun’s
whistleblowing efforts prevented a UN-sanctioned invasion and any further human costs
that could have occurred with such action (Fuller, 2013).
The second case involved Wells Fargo employee Jessie Guitron, who was fired in
2010 after making numerous internal whistleblowing attempts concerning the company’s
fraudulent behavior. She had identified mandated quotas for customer accounts and the
practice of opening accounts for customers without their knowledge, which lead to
increased financial hardships for the unsuspecting customers, including impact to credit
scores. In 2016, the US government ultimately intervened and brought a formal case
against Wells Fargo (“Whistleblower: Wells Fargo fraud”, 2018).
Both scenarios demonstrated the potential for an appropriately timed
whistleblowing event to prevent harm. They also featured individuals who demonstrated
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a higher degree of sensitivity to organizational wrongdoing than their peers. It was this
distinction that was my primary interest and the focus of this study. Whereas the type of
wrongdoing varies across organizations, most styles of misconduct generally follow a
rather predictable pattern of gradual escalation over time through an array of rather subtle
organizational factors. This pattern can lead employees to slowly rationalize observed
misconduct and leaders to escalate the commitment after increasingly risky decisions.
(Anand et al., 2004; Armstrong et al., 2004).
Given this trend, the need for employees to be attuned to indicators of
organizational misconduct early-on, to act sooner rather than later, is even more
important. Therefore, the purpose of this investigation was to provide insight into various
predictors of the likelihood of employees choosing to blow the whistle in response to
organizational wrongdoing. The primary goal was to strengthen the scientific
understanding of how the misconduct is perceived by employees (Ahmad et al., 2014;
Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005) and if/how they choose to respond (Waytz et al.,
2013).
To identify individuals’ thresholds for deciding to blow the whistle, I proposed an
experimental study in which the timing of an organization’s misconduct was a
manipulated, independent variable. Participants were asked to imagine themselves in the
role of an employee at a large technology company who discovers evidence of corporate
misconduct. Then the misconduct was described as either causing eventual harm (future
harm scenario), or current and ongoing harm to other people (current harm scenario). The
essence of the misconduct in both scenarios involved the transfer of large amounts of user
data to a foreign research group without user consent, and with the express purpose of
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altering U.S. election outcomes. In the future harm scenario, the transfer would occur in
one week. In the current harm scenario, the transfer had already occurred by the time it
was discovered. Each participant was randomly assigned one of these two scenarios and
then responded to an assessment of personality variables that have been shown to predict
whistleblowing in prior research. Additionally, the political orientation and news
consumption habits of the participants were assessed, to control for additional influences
of the highly relevant and polarizing subject matter of the scenarios on the participants'
responses.
The practical outcome for the findings from this study is to provide external
authorities and stakeholders (e.g., journalists, investigative governmental entities) with a
means of identifying individuals who are more sensitive to wrongdoing behavior and who
are more likely to take external whistleblowing actions prior to the full expression of
negative consequences of the corporate misconduct, thereby greatly reducing harm to
both the organization and the public. By contrasting the responses of individuals faced
with an urgent, current harm scenario against those who receive a more ambiguous future
harm scenario, the individual differences of participants who choose to engage in
mitigative actions in the future harm scenario can be revealed. Furthermore, this study
can inform organizational leadership about the process by which whistleblowers evaluate
wrongdoing events and choose to act. Specifically, equipping leaders who wish to
promote organizational integrity to understand and welcome the value of these
individuals and the potential to avoid future harm by elevating their voices is paramount.
The following sections presented a review of relevant literature that further
explored the possibility of a moderating effect of personal attributes on the effect of
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corporate wrongdoing on the likelihood the employee to blow the whistle. Next,
hypotheses and underlying rationale were presented. Finally, the methods for testing the
propositions were described. Please see Figure 1 for a preview of the hypothesized model
that was tested.
Literature Review
There were several areas within previous whistleblowing research that informed
the underlying premises of the hypotheses presented in this study. Broadly, the
relationship between the employee and organization needed to be examined to identify
the characteristics of organizational misconduct and subsequent employee responses.
Furthermore, the variation in employee response patterns will provide the framework for
the hypotheses in this study and will further aid in the process of disentangling the
individual difference predictors from situational ones. Consequently, I explored the
elements of this relationship individually and divided them into two overarching
domains. First, the origins and prevalence of organizational wrongdoing and the
outcomes of unrestrained organizations in society today were presented. This domain also
included a discussion of the mechanisms that allow upstanding organizations to descend
into corruption. Second, the theory, activity, and outcomes of whistleblowing events were
explored in detail. Finally, the unique characteristics of specific incidences of
organizational misconduct and how individuals respond were presented as a lead-in to the
hypotheses for the current study.
What is Organizational Wrongdoing?
In this section I provided an overview of organizational wrongdoing, with the
goal of establishing the prevalence of this type of wrongdoing worldwide. A functional
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definition of organizational wrongdoing was provided for use within this study. Previous
frameworks that have been used to categorize types of misconduct are also discussed.
Additionally, the evolution of corruption within organizations and the consequences of
corruption were explored.
Prevalence of Organizational Misconduct
As mentioned previously, whistleblowing efforts are on the rise globally
(Freshﬁelds Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, 2017). Additionally, increases in leaking and
whistleblowing behavior have been observed within the United States (Bade &
Hamberger, 2019; Savage & Sullivan, 2017). These observations of whistleblowing
efforts indicate a growing, systemic rise in corporate wrongdoing. Unfortunately, the
incentives for organizations to engage in unsavory behavior continue to outweigh the
costs. In an investigation of nongovernmental organizational wrongdoing worldwide,
Gibelman and Gelman (2004) found that despite increased visibility of such wrongdoing
(i.e., media exposure of misconduct) and increased accountability mechanisms,
wrongdoing remains prevalent.
Empirical investigations into organizational misconduct are also notoriously
difficult to conduct. Kaleck and Saage-Maaß (2010) examined the existing array of legal
precedents and enforcement procedures worldwide and found that these efforts were
generally insufficient to address the breadth of organizational misconduct. Furthermore,
in an exhaustive review of the existing whistleblowing protections in the U.S. (i.e., the
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower provisions), Moberly (2012) found that these provisions
have been largely insufficient to prevent wrongdoing and to protect whistleblowers. The
inherent challenges to both identifying deviant behavior and implementing legal
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corrective action, leave potential victims of organizational misconduct in a vulnerable
state because the current enforcement infrastructure is inadequate and in need of reform.
Organizational Misconduct Defined
Greve et al. (2010) conceptualize organizational misconduct as “behavior in or by
an organization that a social-control agent judges to transgress a line separating right
from wrong; where such a line can separate legal, ethical, and socially responsible
behavior from their antitheses” (p. 56). This broad definition underscores the complexity
of the behavior and the inherent difficulty in assessing organizational actions and
implementing corrective actions. However, this definition also lacked the specificity
needed for this study. Additional clarity is provided by Vaughan (1999), who
differentiates organizational misconduct from other negative organizational events (i.e.,
mistakes or disasters). Vaughan notes that organizational misconduct can be
characterized as events that feature “acts of omission or commission by individuals or
groups of individuals acting in their organizational roles who violate internal rules, laws,
or administrative regulations on behalf of organization goals” (p. 288). For this current
study, the definition of organizational misconduct features elements from the
conceptualizations above, with organizational misconduct defined as behavior by an
individual or faction within an organization that harms or has the potential to harm
people, both employees, customers, and other external stakeholders. This distinction was
necessary because a focus on harm to human welfare, as opposed to misconduct
involving the organization’s financial losses or legal restrictions, introduces a salient
moral imperative to act in the defense of human wellbeing.
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Types of Misconduct
Another aspect of organizational misconduct that is relevant to the current study is
a framework for evaluating the various types of misconduct within the realm of harm.
Identifying a unifying taxonomy for organizational misconduct has been proven
challenging for past researchers. Lefkowitz (2009) addresses this issue by providing an
extensive review of research concerning organizational misconduct. He provides a
concise overview of six common conceptualizations of organizational misconduct. This
is especially relevant to this study as it provides a broad framework that captures the
potential breadth of misconduct that may occur. The six broad types of organizational
misconduct are: (a) unethical behavior, (b) incivility, (c) organizational deviance, (d)
corruption, (e) organizational misbehavior, and (f) counterproductive workplace behavior
(see p. 65). Unethical behavior refers to actions that violate moral principals within an
organization (e.g., violations of a given organization’s established ethical code of
conduct). Incivility features violations of social norms and can refer to behaviors that are
intentionally rude or hostile. Organizational deviance and organizational misbehavior
both concern actions that contravene organizational norms. In this context, organizational
deviance refers to effects produced by an organization, whether intentional or not, that
deviate from the core functions of the organization and cause harm to either employees or
the broader public. In a similar vein, the organizational misbehavior involves actions by
employees in an organization that purposefully disregard established organizational
practices and norms. Conversely, corruption refers to actions that contradict public
norms, where wrongdoing within an organization can spread to a point at which the
public trust in the organization is diminished. Lastly, counterproductive workplace
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behaviors involve actions by organizational members that intentionally break
organizational norms or rules, thereby negatively impacting the organization.
Lefkowitz also identified the potential for each of these representations of
organizational misconduct to harm either people, the organization, or both. It was this
potential for multiple levels of harm that was of interest when developing a manipulation
of the consequences of an incident of wrongdoing. As discussed previously, wrongdoing
is inherently difficult to define and even more difficult to prevent. Nonetheless, this broad
framework provided a means to identify potential sources of misconduct and primarily
focused on harm to others as the primary feature and outcome of the wrongdoing.
Consequences of Misconduct
The consequences of continued wrongdoing are far-reaching, compounding, and
result in negative outcomes for the organization and beyond. Research from Shadnam
and Lawrence (2011) established a theory of moral collapse within institutions and
suggest that the breakdowns in regulatory and ideologic processes lead to eventual
widespread organizational corruption. Moreover, Linstead et al. (2014) characterize the
negative outcomes of corrupt organizational behavior as the dark side of organizations.
They suggest that organizations can evolve to a deviant state, where misconduct and
corruption is widespread, when systems and non-conforming processes become routine.
These outcomes further underscore the need for corrective mechanisms within
compromised organizations.
To summarize, organizations that have a consistent track record of engaging in
wrongdoing are likely to be undeterred by existing regulatory methods. Furthermore, the
processes that lead to widespread organizational misconduct are complex and may be
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comprised of individual actions, ineffective organizational systems, or some combination
of both. This complexity of the nature of organizational misconduct underscores the
difficulty faced by third-party investigators, who must attempt to definitively establish
that wrongdoing occurred and identify the parties responsible for the wrongdoing within
non-transparent organizations. These difficulties further reinforce the value of an isolated
whistleblowing event as the information exposed by the whistleblowing can be used to
quickly identify the source and nature of the misconduct. Finally, although there are a
multitude of transgressions that can be committed by organizations, I choose to identify
misconduct that harms individuals as the focal type of wrongdoing for this study.
Whereas several prior studies have featured misconduct that is characterized by relatively
tangible, monetary consequences (e.g., Bowen et al., 2010; Brink et al., 2015), the focus
on human welfare in the current study provides participants with a greater moral
imperative to take action to mitigate/prevent the full expression of consequences. As the
evidence and examples cited above illustrate, misconduct of this nature is a current,
salient reality worldwide.
What is Whistleblowing?
In this section, I have provided a detailed examination of the whistleblowing
phenomenon. I began by exploring definitions from the current literature for
whistleblowing before putting forth a conceptualization for the act of whistleblowing for
the current study. Second, I presented the key elements of whistleblowing theory and the
internal mental processes that influence an employee’s decision to act, including a brief
review of past formative whistleblowing research, grouped into organizational,
situational, and personal predictors. Under the personal factor domain, personality traits
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will be discussed in depth as certain personality traits are potential moderators evaluated
in this study. Finally, I wove together evidence to make the case that whistleblowing can
serve as a significant catalyst for organizational change.
Whistleblowing has been defined as “the disclosure by organization members
(former or current) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the control of their
employers, to persons or organizations that may be able to effect action” (Near & Miceli,
1985; p. 4). Internal whistleblowing involves an employee reporting to organizational
leaders or supervisors, whereas external whistleblowing involves reporting to entities
outside an organization (Park, Blenkinsopp, Oktem, & Omurgonulsen, 2008). A further
distinction between these two approaches to reporting can be drawn by examining the
outcome of each. For example, internal whistleblowing efforts can be considered helpful
to an organization and can be conceptualized as being constructively deviant (Galperin,
2012). Conversely, external whistleblowing is not typically beneficial to an organization
and often results in a greater net impact due to increased visibility and scrutiny from
external entities (Dworkin & Baucus, 1998). For this study, while both internal and
external whistleblowing intentions were assessed, the focus was on external
whistleblowing efforts as these represent a powerful check on corporate misconduct
(Pemberton et al., 2012).
Why Do Employees Take the Risk? Predictors of Whistleblowing
The first known theoretical model that identified the predictors of whistleblowing
behavior was developed by Near and Miceli (1985). Broadly, they specified the cognitive
processes used by people who choose to whistleblow. Drawing from both expectancy
theory (Vroom, 1964) and reinforcement theory (Skinner, 1953), they devised a model
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for understanding whistleblowers’ motivations. Through the lens of expectancy theory, a
potential whistleblower evaluates the prospect that their actions will result in the
organization ceasing the misconduct and whether there will be positive versus negative
outcomes for the whistleblower. Furthermore, the application of reinforcement theory to
the whistleblower decision making process provides additional insights when
wrongdoing is a discriminative stimulus. Specifically, wrongdoing that has been
successfully addressed by past whistleblowing efforts will encourage future
whistleblowing behavior. Conversely, when wrongdoing is unimpeded by these efforts,
inaction will be reinforced as an acceptable response.
As the research on whistleblowing progressed, both individual and situational
factors have been identified and added to the original efforts by Near and Miceli (1985).
To capture the breadth of these studies, I organized the following sections into three
broad domains of whistleblowing factors: organizational characteristics that facilitate or
deter whistleblowing efforts, individual characteristics associated with whistleblowing
propensity, and the outcomes of whistleblowing efforts. Unless otherwise indicated, all
factors discussed below positively predict whistleblowing likelihood.
Organizational Characteristics.
A fitting starting point for an investigation into the factors that influence
whistleblowing behaviors is at the organizational level. To further understand the impact
of organizational corruption; the question of the extent to which an organization
encourages or deters whistleblowing activity can shed light on employee reporting
preferences when exposed to wrongdoing. Numerous studies have examined the role of
organizational structures and processes in whistleblowing behavior. Research by Near et
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al. (1993) examined the role of the organization using both power and justice theories and
found that organizations that featured internal legal processes (i.e., established internal
whistleblowing protocols and reporting standards, procedures to mitigate retaliation) for
whistleblowers experienced more favorable consequences of the whistleblowing incident
and for the organization overall than organizations that did not employ internal processes.
They also noted that the level of support for whistleblowing behavior from supervisors
and top management helped to mitigate the risk of retaliation against the whistleblower.
These findings are also echoed in research by Lavena (2016) on whistleblowing within
U.S. federal agencies. She found that not only supervisor support but also organizational
cultures of openness and respect were negatively associated with whistleblowing events.
She proffered a few explanations for this finding, including the possibility that workplace
cultures with these positive attributes result in fewer incidences of misconduct. The
findings from both studies underscore the importance of facilitating structures within
organizations that allow employees to report wrongdoing internally without fear of
retaliation from either supervisors or coworkers.
There are additional structural and environmental factors that predict the
likelihood of whistleblowing activities. For example, the sector in which an organization
exists can influence whistleblowing routes used by employees. Research from Nayır et al.
(2018) found that employees within the public sector were more likely to use internal,
non-anonymous reporting channels while private-sector employees preferred external and
anonymous avenues. Moreover, Pillay and Dorasamy (2011) built a theory identifying
environmental forces that can hinder the success of a whistleblowing effort, including
rigid organizational and governmental structures and large power distances between the
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whistleblower and leadership. Additionally, the behavior of a whistleblower’s
subordinates was also identified as a barrier to whistleblowing efforts due to the potential
for the whistleblower to be viewed as a disloyal group member.
In summary, the structure of an organization, the internal processes available to
employees to report wrongdoing, and the support of management can all influence
whistleblowing activity. The organizational features that signal favorable outcomes for
employees who blow the whistle can provide insights into the reporting route the
employee will take and the employee anonymity preferences. Organizations that signal
hostility towards potential whistleblowers are more likely to experience external
whistleblowing events. It was these hostile organizations that were of focal interest
within this study as employees exposed to wrongdoing would have fewer recourses
available. The next section explored the characteristics of individuals within these
contexts that distinguish whistleblowers from non-whistleblowers.
Individual Characteristics
This section explored the characteristics of whistleblowers that have been
identified in past research efforts. This information was vital to this study as it further
distinguished the individuals that were most likely to respond from those who would not.
I began this section with the characteristics of whistleblowers that are easily observed
(e.g., organizational position) and progressed toward the more abstract characteristics
(e.g., personality, moral reasoning).
The identification of whistleblowing predictors can be found in research
conducted by Vadera et al. (2009). They identified that higher levels of job performance,
organizational position, pay level, education, and placing value on whistleblowing were
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all positive antecedents of whistleblowing efforts. These characteristics further add to the
profile of an employee who is more likely to act if exposed to misconduct. Another
identifying feature of a potential whistleblower is organizational power, which can be
further conceptualized in terms of role legitimacy and employee support (Miceli & Near,
2002). More specifically, individuals who have a high level of role legitimacy and are
supported by co-workers, will not only be more likely to perceive whistleblowing as a
viable action but will also be more confident that their actions will lead to the termination
of organizational wrongdoing (i.e., experience an effective whistleblowing event).
Moving to relatively more abstract whistleblower attributes, a positive connection
has been theorized between individuals who possess prosocial attitudes and
whistleblowing activity (Dozier & Miceli, 1985). These researchers conceptualize
whistleblowing as a type of prosocial behavior, ideally resulting in overall benefit to
others. They further suggest that the motivation for one to engage in prosocial behavior is
influenced by a variety of moral conflicts, as a potential whistleblower weighs the
benefits of an action for others (i.e., acting in a purely altruistic manner) against the
potential personal risks. These findings further inform the current study as Dozier and
Miceli (1985) theorized that the preferences of employees to engage in prosocial
whistleblowing behavior are influenced by both personality and situational
characteristics. This interplay between situation and personality will be discussed further
in the rationale leading to the current study’s hypotheses.
Employee Perceptions of Organizational Misconduct
The question of whether a whistleblower feels morally compelled to act
represented another potentially valuable avenue to explore. Zakaria (2015) makes the
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case that both deontological and teleological evaluations of wrongdoing are antecedent
factors that positively influence whistleblowing intentions. This framework, drawn from
two separate moral philosophies, is particularly relevant to this study as it provides a way
to conceptualize the internal challenges faced by a potential whistleblowing by outlining
the tension that exists between deontological evaluations (i.e., evaluations based on
existing rules) and teleological evaluations (i.e., evaluations based on consequences) of
organizational misconduct. The moral reasoning of employees also influences their
perceptions of retaliation that may be associated with a whistleblowing event
(Liyanarachchi & Newdick, 2009). These studies further illuminate the internal conflict
that potential whistleblowers face and the competing moral evaluations considered before
the decision to act. The relationship between moral reasoning and whistleblowing is
complex and influenced by numerous environmental and situational factors.
Employees within organizations where wrongdoing occurs are firsthand observers
of misconduct and often the victims as of it as well. The response of these employees to
wrongdoing is useful to explore as it can ultimately drive employees to take decisive
actions to address the wrongdoing. To begin the investigation into employee responses,
the model for employee responses to organizational wrongdoing by McLain and Keenan
(1999) provides an excellent foundation. Their model suggests that there are three key
steps in the employee decision making process concerning whether to whistleblow: (a)
awareness, (b) judgement, and (c) a response.
This model was useful within this current investigation because of the breakdown
in employee judgements of wrongdoing helps to explain why whistleblowing responses
are rare. Unfortunately, an employee response to organizational misconduct that has
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become increasingly common is to rationalize the misconduct and allow it to continue
(Anand et al., 2004; Bandura, 1999; Carsten & Uhl-Bien, 2013). Furthermore, many
individuals choose not to whistleblow when they believe that nothing will change if they
do (Brown et al., 2008).
Will the Result be Worth the Risk? Employee Perceptions of Whistleblowing Outcomes
The final consideration in this section was whether a whistleblowing event would
lead to intended outcomes and the cessation of wrongdoing. This echoes the role of
expectancy theory discussed earlier, as this assessment is the crux of an individual’s
decision to whistleblow. This is a crucial factor that a potential whistleblower must
evaluate as the act of whistleblowing involves a high level of personal risk, as these
efforts represent a unique challenge to the power asymmetry that exists between an
individual employee and the employer. External investigations into organizational
misconduct face a multitude of challenges when attempting to observe suspect behaviors
internal to an organization (Kaleck & Saage-Maaß, 2010). This inherent difficulty can
elevate the importance of a whistleblowing event in which the external entities gain
unfettered access into the internal workings of an organization.
When whistleblowing occurs, the organization that is guilty of misconduct can be
harmed in the short-term. However, this harm may be temporary and can provide the
organization with the opportunity to correct its behavior and to engage in reparations for
harmed parties (Anand et al., 2004; Miceli et al., 2012). Aside from the ability for
whistleblowing efforts to check organizational conduct, these efforts can also serve as a
prosocial function by mitigating future harm done by an organization (Tsahuridu, 2011).
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When an employee decides to blow the whistle, especially when an external route
is used, society stands to reap substantial benefits. For organizations guilty of
misconduct, an effective whistleblower can provide insights into the organization that
both external investigators and the broader public would not have obtained otherwise.
Furthermore, the occurrence of a whistleblowing event can potentially prevent further
harm conducted by the organization.
Hypotheses and Rationale
The current study represents an additional step in the ongoing research efforts to
disentangle the complex interplay between individual and situational attributes that
inform the whistleblowing decision. According to Lewin’s (1943) field theory, an
individual’s behavior or intention can be conceptualized as the combination of both
individual characteristics and situational factors at a given point in time. When this model
is applied within a whistleblowing context, it helps to explain the wide range of
individual responses to situations involving wrongdoing, and underscores the inherent
challenges faced by researchers investigating whistleblowing behaviors. When
researchers have examined the situational context for organizational wrongdoing, both
environmental factors (e.g., the influence of other employees and leaders, the
organizational attitudes towards whistleblowing) and the type of wrongdoing have been
identified as predictors of employee responses. Near et al. (2004) found that the type of
wrongdoing observed had a significant effect on employee reporting actions. Specifically,
they identified that employees were more likely to whistleblow under more serious
infractions (e.g., sexual harassment) than when exposed to misconduct involving theft or
company waste. Furthermore, employees choose not to report wrongdoing if they do not
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believe it will result in the organization ceasing the misconduct. These findings further
underscore the impact of situational factors on individual behavior and the potential for
misconduct to rise to a level that will result in consistent whistleblowing responses from
most employees. The next section explored the characteristics of wrongdoing that can
create situations that demand action, alongside factors that lead to inaction and
ambiguity.
Manipulating the Temporal Immediacy of Organizational Misconduct
Although the studies described above have explored variations of the relationship
between wrongdoing and employee responses, the tipping point at which an employee
perceives the misconduct as worthy of reporting remains unclear. The focus of this study
was to examine the responses of participants across two situations that vary with respect
to the harmful consequences of the organization’s misdeeds and, by extension, the
urgency warranted to take meaningful action. Specifically, the intent was to explore how
an individual’s unique frame of reference informs their reporting choices as the harm
resulting from the misconduct escalates. A framework that helps to explain the factors
that influence employee decisions was created by Jones (1991). Jones theorized that the
responses of individuals in ethically complex situations are dependent on the moral
intensity of the situation. He posits that “every ethical issue can be represented in terms
of its moral intensity, a construct that includes six components: magnitude of
consequences, social consensus, probability of effect, temporal immediacy, proximity,
and concentration of effect” (p. 374). Although all six factors play a role in predicting an
employee’s decision making framework, the magnitude of consequences, the probability
of effect, and the temporal immediacy of a wrongdoing scenario are the most applicable
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within a whistleblowing context and best inform the research objectives of this study. The
magnitude of consequences can be conceptualized as the totality of harm that will occur
because of wrongdoing and the probability of effect is the assessment of whether the
wrongdoing observed will result in the predicted harm. Temporal immediacy refers to an
individual’s perception of the temporal lag between the observed wrongdoing and the
subsequent harm. Wrongdoing situations that feature a brief temporal gap between the
wrongdoing itself and the deleterious consequences represent cases of greater temporal
immediacy, whereas longer time lags will result in relatively lower levels of temporal
immediacy.
Research by Singer et al. (1998) further uncovers the role of moral intensity in
contributing to employee decisions to whistleblow. They found that two of the moral
intensity dimensions—the magnitude of the consequences of wrongdoing and the
likelihood that the consequences of wrongdoing would be realized (i.e., probability of
effect)—were positively related to whistleblowing. They also found that after reading
hypothetical scenarios involving varying levels of harm stemming from misconduct,
empathy felt by participants for potential victims was a positive predictor of
whistleblowing intentions. These findings suggest that as individuals’ perceptions of the
deleterious consequences of the misconduct increase, so does their sense of urgency to
report it. Applied within the context of this study, this indicated the potential to hold the
misconduct (i.e., magnitude of the consequences) constant while manipulating the
temporal immediacy of the misconduct for participants. As Jones (1991) states, “the
magnitude of consequences will be discounted in accordance with the temporal distance
of the predicted effects…as the time period between the act in question and its expected
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consequences expands, the probability that the act will actually cause the predicted harm
declines” (p. 376). This provided further rationale for the choice to only manipulate
temporal immediacy in this study, as the nature of this manipulation would subsequently
influence the perception of harm (i.e., more distal consequences may be perceived as less
probable by participants). Furthermore, this approach also allowed for the selection of
any type of organizational misconduct for the study and provided an opportunity to
generate multiple scenarios by varying the proximity of harm.
Thus, for the current study I created two scenarios that depict an identical type of
organizational misconduct but differed due to the temporal immediacy of the
consequences of the misconduct. By distinguishing between reporting behaviors in
response to wrongdoing that is causing current harm and wrongdoing that will cause
future harm if left unchecked, the conditions under which certain employees choose to act
could be better understood. At greater levels of temporal immediacy (i.e., misconduct
causing current and ongoing harm); I expected to observe an increase in the likelihood of
whistleblowing behavior, as a demonstration of the whistleblower’s attempt to
circumvent the damage.

Hypothesis 1. Employees will be more likely to blow the whistle when the
organization’s misconduct is causing current harm than they will in situations
where harm will occur in the future.

Urgent Situations Mask Individual Differences in Predicting Whistleblowing
In the current harm scenario, I expected that individual difference predictors of
whistleblowing would be less noticeable. Conversely, in the future harm scenario when
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the temporal urgency is diminished, individual differences would be much more
pronounced. This prediction was informed by research from Beaty et al. (2001), which
explored the role of individual differences (i.e., personality traits) and contextual
performance under strong versus weak situations. They found support for Mischel’s
(1977) assertion that strong situations will diminish the visibility of individual
differences; whereas under weak situations, individual differences would be more
pronounced. This distinction between the elements of the situation that prompt different
behaviors have been characterized as situational strength. Meyer et al. (2010) define
situational strength as “as implicit or explicit cues provided by external entities regarding
the desirability of potential behaviors” (p. 122). Thus, the presence of an environmental
cue can exert may pressure on certain individuals, eliciting a subsequent behavior. The
degree to which a situation can be considered strong or weak is dependent on the
ambiguity present in the situation, with strong situations featuring distinct indicators of
appropriate responses, and weak situations featuring little guidance for what behavior is
expected (Judge & Zapata, 2015).
This distinction was crucial within this study because the goal of manipulating the
timing of the consequences (i.e., temporal immediacy) of the wrongdoing was to identify
the types of individuals who would act prior to the harm occurring. Specifically, under
conditions of current harm, I expected to observe a greater likelihood of individuals
indicating that they would blow the whistle. Thus, as the overall magnitude and
likelihood of the consequences of organizational wrongdoing are elucidated to an
individual, they should be compelled to act (Singer et al., 1998). However, under
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conditions of future harm, the potential whistleblower may find themselves in a relatively
more ambiguous position.
Added to the complexity of the details of the wrongdoing itself are the social
norms in the organization and the presence of other employees. Latané and Nida (1981)
examined the social inhibitions that prevent an individual from intervening in a crisis.
The authors found both a dampening effect of individual differences in instances when
the situation posed a clear threat and avoidance behaviors (i.e., diffusion of responsibility,
social influence, and audience inhibition) when the threat was less clear. They concluded
that in situations where harm is clear and salient, virtually everyone volunteered to help
the person in need, regardless of whether they were alone or in the company of others. A
recent meta-analysis conducted by Fischer et al. (2011) reported evidence consistent with
this conclusion—namely that in non-ambiguously threatening situations, the presence of
bystander effects is diminished.
Similarly, within the job performance context, Judge and Zapata (2015) found
that in strong situations (i.e., work scenarios with clear expectations) personality effects
were muted whereas, in weaker situations (i.e., work scenarios with ambiguous
expectations), employee personality more strongly predicted performance. These findings
suggest that personality will predict performance more strongly in some situations than
others. Extending this argument to include the situationally contingent relationship
between personality and voluntary organizational citizenship behaviors (OCB’s),
research conducted by Meyer et al. (2014) found that in weak situations, both
agreeableness and conscientiousness more strongly predicted OCB’s than in strong
situations. In summary, in weaker situations that involve acting in a prosocial manner for
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the benefit of the organization, personality may be a stronger predictor of behavior than
in situations where there is less ambiguity or when there are clearer behavioral
expectations.
This potential for individual differences to predict behavior more strongly in less
threatening situations raised the possibility of a moderating role of individual differences
(i.e., personality traits) in how scenarios depicting relatively less harmful occurrences of
organizational misconduct were developed for this current study. Consequently, the
broader purpose of exploring behavior in scenarios depicting lesser harm was the
potential to discover indicators of whistleblowing propensity before the escalation of
harm, thereby mitigating future risk. The following sections explored the moderating role
of personality traits within the relationship between observed harm and whistleblowing
responses.
The Moderating Role of Employee Personality
One of the key variables included in this study as a potential moderator of
whistleblowing behavior is personality, commonly conceptualized and assessed using the
five-factor personality trait structure (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1999; Soto &
John, 2017). The five-factor personality structure is particularly valuable within this
study as it provides a relatively stable and easily observable profile of an individual. This
method can provide insight into critical behavioral indicators, especially when applied
within a whistleblowing context.
The Big Five and Whistleblowing: A Case for Trait Activation. Past research
efforts have studied the relationship between the five-factor personality model and
whistleblowing. When examining the effect of personality on whistleblowing, Bjørkelo et
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al. (2010) found that low levels of agreeableness and high extraversion were predictors of
whistleblowing behavior. Moreover, Brink et al. (2015) found that extraversion and
conscientiousness were positive indicators of whistleblowing likelihood. Although these
studies identified main effects for personality traits on whistleblowing, the argument for
potential moderating effects of these traits warrants additional investigation.
Turning again to extant research supporting the relationship between personality
and job performance as a model (i.e., Barrick & Mount, 1991; Ones et al., 2007), it is
noteworthy that, although personality traits have been consistently found to partially
explain the variance in job performance, the variance explained is rather scant (e.g., for
conscientiousness, the corrected validity coefficient is approximately .20 or 4% of
variance explained). However, adding the moderating role of context is an opportunity to
potentially explain more variability in employee behavior. As aforementioned, Judge and
Zapata (2015) identified enhanced predictive ability for personality traits in weak
situations. Moreover, Tett and Burnett (2003) provide an explanation for the interaction
effects between personality and the situation using Trait Activation Theory. Specifically,
they posit that when an individual encounters a situation featuring cues that are relevant
to one of their personality traits, that trait will be elicited. Furthermore, they argue:
“…the greatest variance in trait-expressive behavior may be expected in weak situations
where extrinsic rewards are modest or ambiguous but only in those situations that are
relevant to the given trait” (p. 502). Thus, although there is little research on the
moderating role of personality within a whistleblowing context, there have been
empirical findings in adjacent subfields of organizational science to suggest that
personality traits can act as moderators when individuals are exposed to relevant
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situational cues within a sufficiently weak or ambiguous situations that would evoke the
manifestations of those traits.
Agreeableness. Research conducted by Bjørkelo et al. (2010) identified the
presence of a main effect of (low levels of) agreeableness and whistleblowing behavior.
They suggest individuals with low agreeableness are more prone to speak out against
wrongdoing and that “whistleblowers are employees who dare to jeopardize how they
look in the eyes of others for the sake of stopping wrongdoing at work” (p. 386). When
evaluating the trait of agreeableness as a potential moderator, the distinction in behavior
for an individual with low levels of agreeableness versus one with high levels of
agreeableness when exposed to wrongdoing can be understood by considering which
individual is more likely to violate group norms. Highly agreeable individuals are
characterized as those who are highly influenced by interpersonal relations and have a
desire for sustained, positive relationships with those around them (Graziano & Tobin,
2002). Research conducted by Graziano et al. (1996) also found that highly agreeable
individuals tend to view conflict differently, in pursuit of maintaining relationships, than
those who are less agreeable. They state that “agreeable people may be more highly
motivated to maintain positive relations with other people, and this motive system may
induce agreeable persons to generate positive perceptions and attributions to otherwiseprovocative behavior” (p. 832). Conversely, research from Witt et al. (2002) found that
individuals who have lower levels of agreeableness are less concerned with interpersonal
relations and are unlikely to comply with organizational politics (e.g., placating leaders to
avoid conflict). Thus, under conditions involving future harm, individuals who have low
levels of agreeableness should be more willing to violate group norms and engage in
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counter normative behavior (i.e., whistleblowing). In contrast, those who are highly
agreeable may be more willing to comply with group norms rather than risk the
disapproval of the group. The disapproval of a group for an individual’s counter
normative behavior is a form of social control and can be a powerful deterrent to norm
violation (Chekroun & Brauer, 2002). Less agreeable individuals may be less subject to
the influence of a group’s social control. However, I expected the effects of
agreeableness to diminish in the current harm condition as the urgency of the situation
takes precedence.

Hypothesis 2. Agreeableness will moderate the effect of the timing of harm on
whistleblowing likelihood. In the future harm condition, those who are less
agreeable will be more likely to whistleblow than those who are more agreeable.
Additionally, in the current harm condition, the magnitude of the effect of
agreeableness on whistleblowing likelihood will be smaller than it will be the
future harm condition. See Figure 2 for a visual depiction of this proposed
moderation.

Conscientiousness. Individuals with high levels of conscientiousness are
characterized as being highly organized, prone to purposeful action, dependable,
responsible, and persistent when faced with challenges (Barrick et al., 1993). The trait of
conscientiousness has been found to be positively related to whistleblowing intentions
(Brink et al., 2015). They surmised that highly conscientious individuals would have a
greater level of self-discipline and would engage in critical thinking prior to acting.
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Expanding on this past research, I explored the potential for high levels of
conscientiousness to act as a moderator that strengthens the association between the
timing of the harmful misconduct and the decision to whistleblow. Research conducted
by Kaplan et al. (2010) found that highly conscientious individuals have an increased
ability to detect organizational threats. They argue that highly conscientious people, who
are relatively more diligent and hardworking, could be more attuned to potential threats
in the environment than their less conscientious counterparts. Highly conscientious
people have not only been found to be more perceptive of potential risk but are also to be
more likely to engage in risk reduction behaviors than those with moderate and low levels
of conscientiousness (Hampson et al., 2000). The tendency of highly conscientious
individuals to be risk-averse has also been demonstrated within the context of workplace
safety. Specifically, a meta-analysis conducted by Beus et al. (2015) examining the role
of personality traits and workplace safety found conscientiousness to be negatively
associated with unsafe behaviors. Finally, research from Van Gelder and De Vries (2016)
found that highly conscientious individuals are unlikely to be enticed by, or participate in,
occupational crime. Conversely, they found that those with low conscientiousness were
less likely to consider long term consequences of risky behavior and were more prone to
engage in unethical activity.
Together these findings provide support for the notion that when highly
conscientious individuals are exposed to conditions involving future harm or illicit
behavior, they may be more inclined to employ strategies to prevent harm associated with
misconduct than their less conscientious coworkers. In situations involving current harm,
in which the situation is relatively unambiguous and the detrimental effects of the
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organization’s misconduct are ongoing in the present, I expected the association of
conscientiousness with reporting likelihood to diminish.

Hypothesis 3. Conscientiousness will moderate the effect of the timing of harm on
whistleblowing likelihood. In the future harm condition, those who are more
conscientious will be more likely to whistleblow than those who are less
conscientious. Additionally, in the current harm condition, the magnitude of the
effect of conscientiousness on whistleblowing likelihood will be smaller than it
will be the future harm condition. See Figure 3 for a visual depiction of this
proposed moderation.
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CHAPTER II
Method
Participants
Inclusion Criteria
Participants were 18+ years of age and lived within the United States. Ideally,
participants would have been employed part or full time within an organization;
nonetheless, the potential to capture whistleblowing perspectives from individuals who
are unable to work, are self-employed, or have been recently laid off would also help to
inform this study. Thus, current employment and work experience for participants were
captured using several demographic questions examining industry, organizational size,
and years of professional working experience.
Recruitment
The data was collected using the online survey platform Prolific. Prolific is an
online marketplace in which registered participants are recruited based on criteria
outlined by the researchers and compensated for completing surveys. For the current
study, participant compensation was set at a living wage of 15 dollars (US) per hour.
Procedure
After the participants accepted the invitation to the study, they were directed to
the survey located on Qualtrics. Based on pilot data, it was expected that the entirety of
the survey would require an average of approximately 9 minutes for participants to
complete. After agreeing to the specifications outlined in the informed consent, they were
asked a series of demographic questions (see Appendix C). Next, participants were
randomly assigned to one of the two scenarios using a Qualtrics randomizer function and
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asked to imagine themselves as an employee in that situation. Then they were asked three
follow-up questions that serve as comprehension checks. Next, the participants responded
to a series of questions from the Attitudes and Cultural Orientation Questionnaire (Park,
Blenkinsopp, Oktem, & Omurgonulsen, 2008) that captured their intentions to blow the
whistle in the given situation. After completing the Big Five Inventory (BFI-2; Soto &
John, 2017), participants were thanked and provided a unique verification code for
compensation.
Sample Size and Power
Aguinis (2004) suggests that the appropriate sample size for a moderated multiple
regression is between 150 and 200 participants. Given this recommendation represents a
minimum threshold and to account for potential missingness, a total sample of 250 was
the target for this study. Each condition will be assigned 125 participants, which will
improve power, the stability of the standard error estimates, and reduce the probability of
type II heteroscedasticity.
Manipulation and Measures
Organizational Wrongdoing Scenarios
This study used a vignette method to expose participants to hypothetical scenarios
involving organizational misconduct and analyze their responses. There have been
multiple studies that have explored whistleblowing intention using survey methods (see
Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005 for an exhaustive review of whistleblowing
research efforts); however, few have used vignettes as a means of varying certain aspects
of the situation surrounding a type of organizational misconduct in an attempt to
strengthen causal inferences. Bjørkelo and Bye (2014) suggest that hypothetical vignettes
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involving potential wrongdoing or survey questions involving various types of
wrongdoing are the two main methods of assessing whistleblowing likelihood.
The Use of the Vignette Method in Past Whistleblowing Studies. Ellis and
Arieli (1999) used three hypothetical situations involving various types of wrongdoing to
determine the likely response of Israeli military personnel. Park, Blenkinsopp, Oktem,
and Omurgonulsen (2008) used a single hypothetical scenario in which participants
imagined that they discovered their employer was engaging in tax evasion and then asked
them to indicate the likelihood that they would blow the whistle. Similarly, Liyanarachchi
and Adler (2011) used a vignette approach with three separate scenarios in which the
participants were placed in a third-person perspective and asked to indicate the likelihood
that a fictional character would blow the whistle. Participants were exposed to all three
scenarios involving various types of accounting misconduct and their responses were
combined into a composite that was meant to reflect their whistleblowing attitudes.
Park, Im, and Keil (2008) introduced an additional level of complexity to
vignette scenarios involving fault reporting within an information technology role by
manipulating both time urgency for reporting and personal responsibility for the fault
within the vignette conditions. Brink et al. (2015) used a similar vignette approach in
which levels of the financial impact of the wrongdoing to an organization were
manipulated to increase the level of misconduct in the scenario. Finally, the study design
that most closely resembles the one to be employed in the present study was conducted
by Andon et al. (2018), who manipulated two levels of financial incentives for employees
who report wrongdoing to ascertain if that variable would affect the reporting likelihood.
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They also examined the participants’ perceptions of the seriousness of the wrongdoing as
a moderator.
In summary, there is a solid precedent in past research for employing the vignette
method in which participants imagine themselves in a scenario and report what they
believe they would do under those specific circumstances. It must be noted that a
substantial critique leveled on this method is that participants are likely overestimating
their propensity to blow the whistle because there is no real-life risk associated with their
decision. Admittedly, this is one of the primary challenges associated with conducting
scientific research on a sensitive and relatively rare phenomenon such as whistleblowing
behavior. Nonetheless, it is hoped that even when accounting for an overestimation of
whistleblowing likelihood (i.e., range restriction on the dependent variable), the findings
could still yield some valuable insights into the ways that individuals judge the nature of
organizational misconduct and make the choice as to whether to report it.
Vignette Method for the Current Study. The current approach builds on these
past efforts but featured some unique distinctions. First, I did not include scenarios
depicting different types of misconduct. Instead, scenarios were crafted to intentionally
vary the timing of the harmful consequences for an identical incident of misconduct. I
modeled the scenarios based on two recent events: the Katharine Gun story detailed
earlier in this manuscript and the Cambridge Analytica whistleblower, Christopher Wylie
(Cadwalladr, 2018). Participants were randomly assigned to a scenario that represented
one of two conditions: a scenario in which the organizational misconduct is resulting in
current, ongoing harm and a scenario in which the misconduct will cause the same level
of harm but occurring in the future.
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The scenarios involved the discovery of evidence of personal data misuse by an
employee (i.e., the participant) at a large technology company. The difference between
the two vignettes was the occurrence of wrongdoing with the first vignette (future harm
scenario) explicitly stating that the misuse would occur within one week of the discovery.
For the second vignette (current harm scenario) the wrongdoing had already occurred. All
other vignette information was intentionally kept identical with only the timing of the
harm manipulated. See Appendix C for the vignettes as they were presented to the
participants.
Manipulation Checks. Each of the two vignettes was followed by a reading
comprehension check question and two questions that were meant to gather evidence for
the construct validity of the scenarios. Specifically, the final two questions assessed the
participants’ understanding of the nature of the wrongdoing depicted and ensured they
perceived that the scenarios differed in terms of the timing of the harm (see Appendix C).
Whistleblowing Likelihood
The Whistleblowing Attitudes and Cultural Orientation Questionnaire (Park,
Blenkinsopp, Oktem, & Omurgonulsen, 2008) was developed to assess a variety of
whistleblowing behaviors and the relationship between the behaviors and participant
attitude, cultural orientation, and nationality. Because whistleblowing attitudes are of key
interest in this study, the cultural orientation subscales were not be used in official
hypothesis testing. However, these subscales were employed in the data collection and
used in exploratory analyses to potentially inform follow-on research.
Measure Description. This questionnaire consists of 24 items with 14 items
assessing whistleblowing attitudes and 10 items assessing cultural orientation. For the 14

35
WHISTLEBLOWING INTENTIONS
whistleblowing attitude items, participants are asked to rate the items using a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disapprove) to 5 (strongly approve). The 14
whistleblowing items are also categorized by whistleblowing route: internal, external,
identified, anonymous, formal, and informal. An example of a whistleblowing attitude
item is, “He reports wrongdoing but doesn’t give any information about himself” (p.
932). In this study, the 14-item scale was modified slightly with each item changed from
the gendered pronoun he to I for each item, placing the participants into a first-person
perspective. For each question, the language used to describe participant actions was also
changed for consistency (i.e., for questions that state “I report”, the language was
changed to “I will report”). Further, the Likert scale anchors were changed from approve
to agree to maintain continuity with the other measures in this study. For analysis, the
items corresponding to the internal and external whistleblowing routes were averaged to
create two separate composite scores (i.e., questions 1-3 for internal whistleblowing and
questions 4-6 for external whistleblowing). These two items, internal whistleblowing
(IWB) and external whistleblowing (EWB) were the focal dependent variables in this
study. The other four whistleblowing routes in this measure were collected for
exploratory analysis.
Reliability and Validity Evidence. The Whistleblowing Attitudes and Cultural
Orientation Questionnaire was administered to a sample of social science undergraduate
students (54.5% male; 45.5% female) from South Korea, Turkey, and the United
Kingdom (N = 759). In the 2008 study, the Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the
whistleblowing items under each whistleblowing route were: internal (α = .72), external
(α = .61), identified (α = .67), anonymous (α = .64), formal (α = .51), and informal (α =
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.59). When used in this study, the alpha coefficients for each subscale were: internal (α =
.93), external (α = .79), identified (α = .82), anonymous (α = .72), formal (α = .71), and
informal (α = .83). Additionally, in a subsequent study, Park et al. (2014) conducted an
exploratory factor analysis (i.e., principal components analysis with varimax rotation) for
the internal, external, identified, and anonymous subscales and reported sufficient
evidence to support four distinct whistleblowing attitudes, accounting for a combined
85% of the variance.
Personality
The Big Five Inventory (BFI-2) created by Soto and John (2017) is a self-report
personality assessment used to identify each of the five personality domains and their
associated facets.
Measure Description. This assessment is comprised of 60 items, a reduction
from the previous 110 item five-factor inventory. Participants will respond to each item
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The 60
items are categorized into the personality domains: (a) extraversion (12 items), (b)
agreeableness (12) items), (c) conscientiousness (12 items), (d) negative emotionality (12
items), and (e) open-mindedness (12 items). An example item from the conscientiousness
subscale reads: “Is persistent, works until the task is finished.” For analysis, the items
corresponding to each personality domain will be combined and averaged to create a
composite score. See Appendix C for the full measure.
Reliability and Validity Evidence. Internal consistency was assessed using
Cronbach’s alpha across two separate samples, an online sample and a student sample
respectively with alpha coefficients reported as: extraversion (α = .88/.88), agreeableness
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(α = .83/.85), conscientiousness (α = .88/.86), negative emotionality (α = .90/.90), and
open-mindedness (α = .84/.85). When used in this study, the alpha coefficients for each
of the 5 subscales were: extraversion (α = .87), agreeableness (α = .84), conscientiousness
(α = .90), negative emotionality (α = .91), and open-mindedness (α = .85).
The authors demonstrated convergent and discriminant validity across each of the
5 domains by evaluating domain level correlations between the BFI-2 and five other
personality measures (i.e., BFI, BFAS, Mini-markers, NEO-FFI, and NEO PI-R; see Soto
& John, 2017). They reported strong convergent validity between the BFI-2 and existing
measures and indicated that the monotrait-heteromethod correlations were much stronger
than both heterotrait-heteromethod and heterotrait-monomethod correlations. They also
conducted an exploratory factor analysis employing a principal components extraction
with Varimax rotation to determine factor loading for each of the five domains and found
that each item loaded onto its associated domain factor for both samples (i.e., all loadings
were .39 or better for the online sample and .45 or better for the student sample). This
was followed by a confirmatory factor analysis where the authors indicated acceptable
model fit as the comparative fit index (CFI) for both online and student samples ranged
from .902 to .952, and the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA) ranged for
.054 to .081.
Covariates: Political Orientation and News Consumption
Due to the unique politically sensitive nature of the vignettes created for this
study, there was the possibility the variance observed in participant whistleblowing
responses would be partially explained by either the participant's political orientation or
the extent to which the participant was aware of current events. Because the election
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meddling efforts in the 2016 election favored the more conservative candidate, the
potential influence of participant political orientation was an important consideration.
Thus, individuals identify as more liberal could have been more concerned with future
election meddling and thereby more inclined to whistleblow than those who are more
conservative. Likewise, individuals who frequently consume news may better understand
the potential ramifications of election meddling. These individuals may be more likely to
perceive the misconduct as problematic and choose to whistleblow than those who do not
consume news and are less aware of current events.
Aguinis (2004) has demonstrated through several data simulations that moderations
featuring a categorical predictor interacting with a continuous predictor are typically
small and difficult to detect. Because news consumption and political affiliation could
theoretically account for additional variability in the dependent variable (i.e.,
whistleblowing likelihood), I included both variables as controls in order to explain more
irrelevant variance in the dependent variables, thereby increasing the likelihood of
finding a significant moderation. Both covariates were assessed using two, single-item
measures. The political orientation question was developed by Haidt and Graham (2007)
and the news consumption measure was created by the author expressly for this current
study. The political orientation question features a single item that states: “Please indicate
your political orientation.” Responses to this item are captured using a 7-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (extremely conservative) to 7 (extremely liberal). The news
consumption question states: “Please indicate the extent to which you follow national and
political news reporting.” This measure features a 10-point sliding scale ranging from 1
(does not consume any news) to 10 (daily news consumption).
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CHAPTER III
Analyses
After successfully collecting a dataset of 250 cases using the prolific platform, I
prepared the dataset for analysis through a structured data cleaning process. These
preparation steps are detailed in the following section. Next, I transformed the focal study
variables (i.e., BFI-2 factors, whistleblowing attitudes) into composite scores. After
correcting the reverse coded items on the BFI-2, I created average scores for each of the
5-factor domains, and each of the whistleblowing routes (i.e., internal whistleblowing and
external whistleblowing).
The next step was to test the statistical assumptions for both the moderated
multiple regression analyses and independent t-tests. The procedures are detailed in the
section below. I then generated descriptive statistics for the dataset and created Table 2 to
provide demographic information and Table 3 to report variable means, standard
deviations, correlations, and internal consistencies. Next, I tested the three core
hypotheses in the study. For the first hypothesis, I used a series of independent t-tests to
determine the mean differences in whistleblowing outcomes between both experimental
conditions. To test hypotheses two and three, I ran moderated multiple regressions for
each whistleblowing outcome (i.e., internal and external) to determine whether the
personality traits of agreeableness and conscientiousness were moderators. In these
analyses, the experimental condition represented the independent variable (IV) and
whistleblowing outcomes of both internal and external whistleblowing were the
dependent variables (DV). Finally, I conducted several exploratory analyses to ascertain
if the remaining five-factor traits (i.e., extraversion, open-mindedness, and negative
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emotionality), along with news consumption and political orientation, moderated the
relationship between the experimental condition and both internal and external
whistleblowing outcomes. Finally, both news consumption and political orientation were
entered as covariates into the full moderation models for agreeableness and
conscientiousness across both whistleblowing outcomes.

Results
Data Preparation
Upon completion of the data collection process on Prolific, I began the data
cleaning process by first removing the automated system outputs (e.g., IP addresses,
unique response identifiers) after screening for duplicate cases. No duplicate cases were
identified, resulting in a sample of 250 cases, featuring 125 cases in each of the vignette
conditions.
Missingness
To assess for missingness, I began with a visual assessment of the dataset to
screen for missing values, followed by a frequency analysis to determine item-level
missingness for each variable. Following the guidelines provided by Olinsky et al. (2003)
for determining acceptable missingness levels, I determined that none of the cases that
had less than 24% complete data at the case level and therefore all cases were acceptable
for inclusion in analyses. I used Microsoft Excel to determine the percentage of
missingness by case and found only 44 contained missingness at the item level. Of those
cases, all but two had 1-2% missingness (i.e., 1-2 items), with one case missing 3% and
another, 8%. To assess scale-level missingness, I used frequency counts in SPSS to
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identify missing values. Across all variables, none exceeded 24% missingness. Finally, I
used Little’s MCAR test (Baraldi & Enders, 2010) to assess for any patterns of item-level
missingness. The results were non-significant χ2(3706) = 3797.26, p = .15, indicating no
reason to suspect data were not missing completely at random. Thus, all cases and
variables met the threshold for inclusion in both preliminary and primary analyses for this
study.
Outliers
The data was assessed for outliers using procedures outlined by Field (2013) and
Orr, Sackett, and Dubois (1991). Using the SPSS frequency analyses and histogram
graphics for each variable, I performed a visual inspection for outliers within the dataset.
After completing this analysis, no responses were identified as extreme outliers, which
indicated that the data was appropriately suited for further analysis and that no winsoring
was required.
Testing Statistical Assumptions
Then the following assumptions for the independent t-tests and moderated
multiple regressions were checked: (a) linearity, (b) independence, (c) normal distribution
of residuals, (d) homogeneity of variance (Field, 2013). To test the assumptions of
linearity, independence, and normal distribution of residuals, I ran frequency tests for all
the focal study variables and used visual inspections of histogram outputs to identify
anomalies. Additionally, I ran simple linear regressions between the predictor and
outcome variables to obtain histogram outputs of residual values for these variables.
After running these tests, I was able to determine that none of the above assumptions had
been violated. I tested the assumption of homogeneity of variance for each independent t-
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test, using the Levene’s test method, which features an acceptance criterion of .05 or
higher to confirm that this assumption was not violated and that equal variances could be
assumed. For each of the t-test analyses in this study, Levene’s was non-significant, and
there were no statistically significant correlations. Finally, type 2 heteroscedasticity was
assessed through visual inspections of the regression histogram outputs between the
predictor and outcome variables mentioned above. Furthermore, the risk of type 2
heteroscedasticity was further reduced by ensuring equal group sizes for each vignette
scenario.
Procedures for Testing Hypothesized Moderations
To assess each proposed moderation in both hypotheses two and three, I used the
PROCESS macro in SPSS to conduct each analysis. To capture the breadth of potential
whistleblowing intentions in these analyses, I utilized both IWB and EWB outcome
measures. For each hypothesis below, I have included a separate moderation analyses for
each of the whistleblowing outcomes. To test each of the following 4 moderations (i.e., 2
analyses for hypothesis two, and 2 analyses for hypothesis three), I used the SPSS
PROCESS macro model 1 (Hayes, 2013). For all the moderation analyses, I centered the
predictors in PROCESS in order to reduce multicollinearity. In each moderation analysis,
the two-level scenario (i.e., current and future harm) was modeled as the predictor, with
IWB and EWB as the dependent variables. The agreeableness and conscientiousness
variables were each entered as moderators within their associated models.
Preliminary Analyses
I began the preliminary analysis by generating both descriptive statistics for the
demographic variables (see Table 2) and running bivariate correlations for the focal study
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variables in SPSS (see Table 3). Additionally, I calculated the alpha coefficients for each
scale used and have provided the results for each variable in Table 3. It is worth noting
that the external whistleblowing scale (α = .79) did not reach the ideal alpha threshold of
>.80 (Gliem & Gliem, 2003; Cortina, 1993). The questionable precision of this measure
can potentially have a dampening effect on power in the moderation analyses (Aguinis,
1995). Next, I checked to see whether the random assignment of participants into vignette
scenarios was truly random by running a series of independent t-tests for each of the
variables listed in Table 3 and to ascertain if there were any significant correlations
between those variables and the assigned scenario.
To assess the manipulation check questions, frequency counts and independent ttests were used to determine the mean differences in condition responses. The first served
both as a reading comprehension check and a way to evaluate the perceived temporal
immediacy of the misconduct, requiring participants to indicate whether the data transfer
had already occurred. Because this question elicited a binary response (i.e., yes/no) where
participants were asked, frequency counts were used to assess the success rate of
participants who correctly identified the nature of the wrongdoing detailed in each
vignette. For the future harm vignette, 3 participants (2%) failed the reading
comprehension check, and 8 participants (6%) failed in the current harm vignette.
Following the guidelines from Aronow et al. (2016), the participants who failed this
manipulation check were not excluded from the primary analyses, as the practice of
dropping participants who fail post-treatment manipulation checks can introduce
unknown bias. The authors demonstrated through simulations that when all participants
are included, the estimates of the manipulation effects are more accurately assessed,
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provided that random assignment is used. However, when individuals who do not pass
post-treatment manipulation checks are removed from subsequent analyses, the results
can be akin to treatment correlated attrition. For example, those who passed the
manipulation check may be systematically different in unknown ways from those who
failed, thereby introducing confounds that harm causal inferences. Thus, in this current
study, participants were retained regardless of whether they passed the manipulation
checks.
Next, I ran independent t-tests to determine the extent to which participant
perceptions of both harm and severity differed significantly across the scenarios. For
perceptions of the severity of the organization’s wrongdoing, the future harm scenario (M
= 8.04, SD = 2.03) was rated slightly higher than the current harm one (M = 7.97, SD =
2.42); however, the difference was not significant t(248) = .25, p = .80, d = .03. For harm
perceptions, the future harm scenario (M = 6.66, SD = 2.75) was rated slightly higher
than the current harm scenario (M = 6.61, SE = 2.89); however, the difference was not
significant t(248) = .16, p = .87, d = .02.
Because of the non-significant mean differences between both perceptions of
severity between scenarios, I followed the t-tests above with an internal analysis as
recommended by Aronson et al. (1990). This was conducted using two multiple
regression analyses, each with one of the manipulation check questions used as the
independent variable in place of the experimental condition. The first analysis evaluated
the relationship between both perception of severity and perception of harm predicting
internal (IWB) whistleblowing intentions respectively, and the second analysis evaluated
the same variables predicting external (EWB) intentions (see Table 4). For the IWB
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outcome, neither perception of severity (B = .06, p = .16) or perception of harm (B = -.02,
p =.57) were significant predictors. Conversely, perception of severity (B = .08, p = .02)
and perception of harm (B = .09, p = .001) significantly predicted EWB.
Thus overall, the participants rated the wrongdoing in the vignettes to be
moderately severe and harmful, indicating that the manipulation did not produce a
meaningful distinction in the participants’ minds about the sense of urgency across the
two situations. However, both severity and harm perceptions did positively and
significantly predict EWB intentions. The ramifications of the weak performance of the
manipulation will be addressed in the limitation section.
Primary Analyses
Hypothesis One
Hypothesis one stated that participants would be more likely to blow the whistle
when the organization’s misconduct was causing current harm than future harm. I ran a
series of independent t-tests to ascertain the mean differences in whistleblowing
likelihood between the two scenarios. Two separate dependent variables (DV’s) were
tested: (a) internal whistleblowing intentions (IWB), and (b) external whistleblowing
intentions (EWB). For IWB, the future harm scenario (M = 3.72, SD = 1.05) was slightly
higher than the current harm scenario (M = 3.66, SD = 1.16), and the difference was not
significant t(248) = .46, p = .65, d = .05. For EWB, the future harm scenario (M = 3.40,
SD = .98) was slightly higher than the current harm scenario (M = 3.34, SD = 1.02);
however, the difference was not significant t(248) = .44, p = .66, d = .06. In summary,
hypothesis one was not supported.
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Hypothesis Two
In this hypothesis I proposed that agreeableness would moderate the effect of the
timing of harm on whistleblowing likelihood. In the future harm scenario, those who
were less agreeable would be more likely to whistleblow than those who were more
agreeable. Additionally, in the current harm condition, the magnitude of the effect of
agreeableness on whistleblowing likelihood would be smaller than it would be in the
future harm condition. The results of the first analysis assessing the moderating role of
agreeableness between the two scenarios and IWB responses, there was a significant
main effect for agreeableness, but the interaction was not significant (Bharm
occurrence*agreeableness

= -.14, p = .54). For EWB, there was no significant main effect and a

non-significant interaction effect (Bharm occurrence*agreeableness = -.07, p = .73). See Table 5 for
the comparative outputs of both analyses. These results indicated that hypothesis two
could not be supported.
Hypothesis Three
In the final hypothesis of this study I proposed that conscientiousness would
moderate the effect of the timing of harm on whistleblowing likelihood. In the future
harm scenario, those who were more conscientious would be more likely to whistleblow
than those who were less conscientious. Additionally, in the current harm condition, the
magnitude of the effect of conscientiousness on whistleblowing likelihood would be
smaller than it would be in the future harm condition. For the first analysis of the
moderating role of conscientiousness between the vignette scenarios and IWB intentions,
a significant main effect was observed for conscientiousness. The interaction effect for
this analysis was not significant (Bharm occurrence*conscientiousness= .04, p = .82). For the EWB
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analysis there was no significant main effect and a non-significant interaction (Bharm
occurrence*conscientiousness

= -.03, p = .88). See Table 6 for the comparative outputs of both

analyses. Thus, hypothesis three was not supported.
Exploratory Analyses
The following exploratory analyses examined the potential moderating roles of
the remaining 5-factor personality traits in the relationship between the vignette scenarios
and both whistleblowing outcomes. The final two analyses explore the role of news
consumption and political orientation as potential moderators in the same relationship
detailed above.
Extraversion, Open Mindedness, and Negative Emotionality
The first trait evaluated was extraversion (see Table 7). The results indicated a
significant main effect for IWB and a non-significant main effect for EWB. There was a
non-significant interaction for both IWB (Bharm occurrence*extraversion = .05, p = .80) and EWB
(Bharm occurrence*extraversion = .02, p = .90). Next, open mindedness was assessed (see Table
8), and the results indicated another significant main effect for both IWB and EWB. Both
interactions for IWB (Bharm occurrence*open mindedness = .32, p = .14) and EWB were nonsignificant (Bharm occurrence*open mindedness = .01, p = .98. Finally, negative emotionality (see
Table 9) was assessed and showed a similar pattern, with a significant main effect for
IWB but not for EWB. There were also non-significant interactions for IWB (Bharm
occurrence*negative emotionality

= -.06, p = .71), and EWB (Bharm occurrence*negative emotionality = -.09, p

= .54).
News Consumption and Political Orientation
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These analyses were re-run with the news consumption and political orientation
covariates included to ensure that potential moderation effects were not masked by
unaccounted variance in the dependent variable. I began this process checking to see
whether either of the proposed covariates was significantly correlated with the
whistleblowing outcomes. This condition was met, as there were significant correlations
between both covariates and whistleblowing outcomes (see Table 3). For the IWB
outcome, was a significant positive correlation with news consumption (r = .15, p = .02).
Significant positive correlations were also found between news consumption and EWB (r
= .24, p = .002), and between political orientation and EWB (r = .19, p < .001).
Ruling Out Potential Moderators. Next, to establish that news consumption and
political orientation did not influence either whistleblowing outcomes, I tested to see if
either variable moderated the relationship between the scenario and both IWB and EWB
outcomes. This was done to rule out the possibility that either covariate was instead a
moderator, in which case the inclusion of the covariate would not be appropriate. First,
the moderating role of news consumption (see Table 10) was assessed. Although results
suggested a significant main effect for both IWB and EWB, the interaction was nonsignificant for both IWB (Bharm occurrence*news consumption = .06, p = .21), and EWB (Bharm
occurrence*news consumption =

-.01, p = .83). Second, political orientation (see Table 11) was

analyzed and a significant main effect was identified for EWB but not for IWB. The
interaction was also non-significant for IWB (Bharm occurrence*political orientation = .08, p = .39),
and EWB (Bharm occurrence*political orientation = .09, p = .28). Because neither variable was a
significant moderator, and both variables were significantly correlated with
whistleblowing outcomes, the inclusion of both variables as covariates was justified.
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Inclusion of Covariates. The final step in this process was to include the two
covariates in the full moderation models for the central hypotheses of this study. This was
done to ensure that including these variables as controls within the original models
proposed in hypotheses two and three did not make the interaction effects significant.
Thus, four additional moderation analyses were conducted with these covariates included.
The first two analyses (see Table 12) addressed hypothesis two, and assessed the trait of
agreeableness as a moderator, for both IWB and EWB outcomes with both news
consumption and political orientation included as covariates. For the IWB outcome
analysis, only the news consumption covariate was found to have a significant main
effect, but the interaction was not significant. In the EWB analysis, both news
consumption and political orientation covariates had significant main effects in the
model, but again the interaction was not significant. The next two analyses (see Table 13)
assessed hypothesis three, with conscientiousness as a moderator for both whistleblowing
outcomes with the two covariates included. In the IWB analysis, neither news
consumption nor political orientation had significant main effects, and the interaction was
not significant. Finally, in the EWB analysis, both news consumption and political
orientation had a significant main effect in the model, but again the interaction was not
significant.
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CHAPTER IV
Discussion
The findings of this study underscore the inherent complexity in predicting
employee whistleblowing behavior and present some practical and theoretical
implications for those who endeavor to further understand these phenomena and improve
the systems of support for potential whistleblowers in high risk, corrupt organizations.
Broadly, the hypothesized models of the moderating effects of agreeableness and
conscientiousness did not produce significant interactions in this study, but this does not
necessarily mean that moderation effects do not exist. Instead, these findings indicate that
the manipulations used in this study simply did not induce enough variability in
participant whistleblowing responses. When modeled agreeableness explained
approximately 4% of the variance for IWB and less than 1% of the variance for EWB.
Likewise, conscientiousness explained 5% of the variance for IWB and less than 1% of
the variance for EWB. Furthermore, positive bivariate correlations were found between
in both agreeableness and IWB, and conscientious and IWB. These positive bivariate
correlations, and preference for IWB routes, can provide both researchers and
organizational leaders with insights into how a potential whistleblower may respond
when exposed to organizational misconduct.
In the following sections, the implications for theory and practice gleaned from
the significant findings in this study are presented. Broadly, two central themes emerged:
(a) the implications of significant bivariate correlations between agreeableness and
conscientiousness and internal whistleblowing intentions (IWB), (b) the preference
demonstrated by participants for internal reporting routes. Next, the limitations of the
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methods used in this study are discussed, followed by potential future research directions.
Finally concluding remarks are provided, which detail recent whistleblowing
developments that occurred during this study and highlight the urgent need to continue to
scientifically investigate whistleblowing-related phenomena.
Implications for Theory and Practice
Personality and Whistleblowing
The first prominent theme of the findings was that both agreeableness and
conscientiousness positively predicted internal whistleblowing intentions. However, this
relationship was only significant for IWB (see Table 3). This demonstrated preference for
internal reporting channels can provide valuable insights into the decision-making
processes of both highly conscientious and highly agreeable individuals. The implications
for these findings across both theory and practice for each trait are discussed in the
following sections.
Agreeableness. Research from Bjørkelo et al. (2010) found that low levels of
agreeableness were positive predictors of whistleblowing behavior. Interestingly, the
findings of this current investigation contravene the Bjørkelo et al. findings, as
individuals with higher agreeableness were more likely to engage in IWB. This finding
contradicts the rationale that less agreeable individuals will be less constricted by group
norms than those who are more agreeable.
This effect may be partially explained by the findings of Özbağ (2016), who
suggested that individuals who are highly agreeable would be concerned with the welfare
of fellow employees. This idea is also supported by research from Ilies et al. (2006), who
identified a positive relationship between highly agreeable employees and organizational
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citizenship behaviors. Furthermore, highly agreeable employees may also be more
willing to act to benefit the public as well, as there is a strong connection between
agreeableness and prosocial behavior (Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997). Applied within a
whistleblowing context, agreeable individuals may also consider the potential harm that
an organization may cause to external entities (i.e., customers, the general public). When
evaluating the responses of individuals to helping others in extraordinary situations,
Graziano et al. (2007) found that highly agreeable people were more likely to accept risk
and help strangers in need than those who were less agreeable. This concern for both
fellow employees and broader organizational wellbeing is in alignment with the findings
of this investigation, as participants with high agreeableness scores were more likely to
engage in lower personal risk, IWB routes.
Conscientiousness. The conscientiousness finding was consistent with the work
of Brink et al. (2015) and Bjørkelo et al. (2010), where both studies found significant
effects for conscientiousness. This replication of past findings is noteworthy as it
reinforces the notion that conscientious individuals may serve as bulwarks against
organizational misconduct. For example, highly conscientious employees are less likely
to engage in unsafe workplace behaviors (Beus et al., 2015), and have a lower probability
of being enticed by occupational crime (Van Gelder & De Vries, 2016).
The mechanism that drives conscientious individuals more readily demonstrate
IWB intentions might be partially explained by a sense of dutifulness. Dutifulness
conceptualized as a sub-facet of conscientiousness and is defined as a “strict adherence to
standards of conduct” (Costa et al., 1991; p. 889). Furthermore, as Ceva and Bocchiola
(2020) note, under a deontic view of whistleblowing an employee may view reporting via
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an internal channel as an obligatory duty. This further supports the preference for IWB
rather than EWB, as the idea of dutifulness and a desire for compliance with established
procedures, can drive conscientious individuals to use internal channels, regardless of the
severity of the misconduct.
Another explanation for the strong correlation between conscientiousness and
IWB may be partially explained by the reactions of more conscientious individuals to the
manipulation used in this study. One possibility is that an artifact of social desirability
accounts for a portion of the variability observed, as consistent correlations have been
found between conscientiousness and social desirability (Ones et al., 1996). The presence
of social desirability influences may drive participants to respond to hypothetical
scenarios in a more positive, pro-social manner. This effect was identified by Ahmad et
al. (2014) who found that social desirability biases can influence participant responses to
whistleblowing vignettes. The potential for a social desirability bias to influence
participant responses is concerning and may further limit the generalizability of the
conscientiousness findings in this study.
Identifying Potential Whistleblowers. The implications of these findings from
applied perspective can provide those who wish to recruit potential whistleblowers (i.e.,
law enforcement entities, regulatory bodies), with a means of profiling viable candidates.
When considering the utility of using personality trait assessments in this manner, it also
raises questions of the extent to which the full five factor model can predict
whistleblowing intentions. When examined using an exploratory analysis in this study, all
five traits combined explained 9% of the variance in IWB and 6% of the variance in
EWB (see Table 14). These findings underscore the informative power of these

54
WHISTLEBLOWING INTENTIONS
assessments, as part of a broader profile of a potential whistleblower. Juxtaposed with the
varying degrees of ambiguity and risk that employees face when exposed to
organizational misconduct, the ability to predict even a small degree of variance in future
whistleblowing attitudes using stable trait attributes rather than variable situational
factors can be a powerful asset. Further, these efforts can also be enhanced by the ability
to capture accurate personality assessments from outside an organization, using online
environments (Park, et al., 2015). Using such methods could drastically expand the scope
of vetting efforts for potential whistleblowers within a given organization from a case by
case approach to organization wide screening. This type of approach may be of value to
external authorities who wish to identify individuals who are more likely to engage in
reporting behaviors than others. If individuals who have a trait-based predisposition to
engage in risk mitigation efforts can be identified at the onset of organizational
misconduct, then perhaps greater levels of harm may be prevented.
Internal Whistleblowing Preference
The participants in this study demonstrated a preference for internal
whistleblowing responses over external whistleblowing. This finding indicates that
internal reporting is the preferred route for employees who do not know what to do when
faced with wrongdoing. A clear implication of this finding of organizational leaders who
wish to promote and encourage internal reporting is that the creation of strong internal
reporting systems that safeguard the whistleblower is of utmost importance. Creating
effective internal reporting systems not only includes the development of safe reporting
channels but the “undertaking of the complex process of developing an organizational
culture that is supportive of employee voice” (Berry, 2004; p. 3). Furthermore, from an
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organizational risk perspective, providing internal reporting channels for employees can
circumvent the potential harm to the organization from an external whistleblowing event
(Miceli et al., 2009; Dworkin & Baucus, 1998).
From an employee risk perspective, internal reporting, although still exposing the
employee to potential retaliation, may appear to be less of a risk than external reporting.
Latan et al. (2018) found that personal cost of reporting (i.e., the perception of potential
harm) was a negative of both internal and external whistleblowing behaviors, suggesting
that as the level of personal cost perceived the employee increased; the likelihood of
reporting decreased. However, they also found that the perception of organizational
support moderated this relationship, indicating that a supportive organization can help
employees to better accept personal costs and whistleblow.
Because employees often attempt to whistleblow through established internal
channels before resorting to external whistleblowing (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran,
2005; Miceli & Near, 2002); systems of positive organizational support and anonymous
internal reporting channels are crucial for organizational leaders who value limiting both
the occurrence of misconduct and the risk of external whistleblowing events. Put more
bluntly by Watts and Buckley (2017) “organizations that fail to implement or respond
appropriately to internal reporting mechanisms are only setting themselves up for an
external whistleblowing catastrophe” (p. 681). Consequently, for organizations that value
risk mitigation, establishing internal reporting channels is the safest, most pragmatic
option.
Counter-Whistleblowing Efforts. A discussion of the benefits of internal
reporting channels would be incomplete without a mention of the potential for these
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findings to be misused by those in corrupt organizations who seek to suppress and silence
whistleblowers. Unfortunately, it is difficult to discuss the merits of championing
whistleblowing efforts in today’s organizations without also presenting the difficult
realities of organizational power and corruption. As Martin and Rifkin (2004) note,
leaders who possess a Machiavellian perspective may be able to infer countermeasures
against whistleblowers from academic research intended to increase both whistleblowing
occurrence and effectiveness. Although the potential to provide corrupt leaders with
insights into reducing whistleblowing occurrence is antithetical to the purposes of this
current study, it is worthwhile to note several of the countermeasures used by
organizations to stop whistleblowers.
First, whereas the use of internal reporting channels provides upstanding
organizations with a means of correcting misconduct, Martin and Rifkin (2004) identify
the opposite effect for corrupt organizations. They posit that directing a potential
whistleblower towards established reporting channels can minimize the potential impact
of the whistleblower revelation and can provide a corrupt organization with the ability to
quickly shift the incident out of public view. They state that “instead of the struggle being
between a truth-speaking employee who is victimized by a powerful employer, the matter
is transformed into a dispute seemingly being adjudicated independently and fairly, in
which the parties in contention are on something close to an equal footing” (p. 14).
Furthermore, they note that for whistleblowers who end up facing organizations in legal
proceedings, many cannot meet the high expense associated with sustained legal actions,
and in the case that a settlement is reached with the whistleblower, it will be conditioned
on a silencing clause. It is also worth noting that the failure to utilize official reporting
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channels and instead engage in external whistleblowing can be used by organizations to
further degrade the legitimacy of a whistleblower.
This underscores a second approach used by corrupt organizations, which is to
attack the whistleblower. As Sawyer, Johnson, and Holub (2010) note, leaders in
organizations that are engaged in misconduct yet wish to appear legitimate, will
fundamentally need to ensure that whistleblowers appear illegitimate. They also state
that, from an organization perspective, an identified whistleblower is likely to report
wrongdoing again in the future. This assumption by organizational leaders can then be
used as a justification to informally blacklist a whistleblower, resulting in catastrophic
effects for the individual’s career and well-being. Stark findings from Rothschild (2013)
show severe patterns of retaliation against whistleblowers, which were indicated by twothirds of the whistleblowers in that study. These findings appear to only apply to internal
whistleblowers because Rothschild indicated that retaliation against external
whistleblowers was much higher. These efforts from leaders to retaliate against
whistleblowers also signal negative consequences to the remaining employees, which can
limit further subsequent whistleblowing attempts. In a proposed model of organizational
silencing behaviors, Morrison and Milliken (2000) note that if negative consequences for
a dissenting employee can be observed or inferred by other employees, then a culture of
silence can develop within an organization. In such a case, employees across an
organization can share a belief that dissenting voices will be targeted and punished.
In summary, whistleblowers are often confronted with an extreme power
asymmetry as they work against motivated and well-resourced entities. It is difficult to
conceptualize the magnitude of risk assumed by a whistleblower and the near-certainty of
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subsequent organizational retaliation. Yet the risk of unchecked organizational power is
very real and, without intervention, can result in disastrous consequences for employees.
In a case study from Varman and Al-Amoudi (2016) examining the atrocities committed
by the Coca-Cola company in rural India, the devastating effects that unchecked
organizational power can have on an entire region are obvious, especially when
dissenting voices are actively targeted. They detail the extent to which an organization
with a high level of power and wealth can establish itself within a vulnerable population,
and exert influence across local government, media, and judicial systems. In doing so, the
Coca-Cola company was able to operate unchecked, and exploited both worker rights and
environmental resources to maximize profit. Furthermore, they were able to reframe and
dismiss activist movements as anti-American sentiment. Thus, to avoid the perpetuation
of these patterns of organizational injustice, it behooves organizations and society overall
in the long-term to incentivize the protection of whistleblowers.
Limitations
Perhaps one of the most troubling, albeit intriguing, implications of this study was
the limits of the experimental method employed. The findings of this study echo many of
the concerns raised by Yarkoni (2019), who stresses that the potential for the application
of experimental findings have limited practicality concerning generalizability. The
limitations of the experimental design used in this study quickly surfaced, especially
when attempting to provide practical implications for real future whistleblowers from
extrapolated participant responses in a controlled environment. Thus, the following
discussion is cautiously framed under this constraint of limited generalizability, and
potentially better-suited methods for exploring this phenomenon are presented.

59
WHISTLEBLOWING INTENTIONS
The whistleblowing likelihood responses, for both IWB and EWB, were notably
non-committal, with the mean response rising just above 3 on a 5-point scale. Contrasting
this response with the much higher perceptions of harm and severity across both vignettes
raises questions concerning the efficacy of the manipulation itself. Furthermore, the
differences in perceptions of harm and severity between scenarios were not significant,
nor were the differences either IWB or EWB intentions. To shed light on this
discrepancy, I also ran regression analyses between both harm and severity manipulation
check questions as the independent variables predicting both IWB and EWB outcomes
(see Table 4). Aronson et al. (1990) recommends an internal analysis as a way to explore
why a manipulation may not be working as intended. These analyses indicated that the
participant perceptions of harm and severity (respectively) only significantly predicted
EWB intentions. This suggests that although the role of the manipulation did not function
as intended, the participant perceptions of the scenarios of both harm and severity
positively predicated likelihood to engage in EWB. However, this is the limit of the
inferences that can be made at this point, as there is no way to understand what caused
participants to perceive harm and severity as they did, absent an effective manipulation.
Additionally, the manipulation check question used to capture the participant’s
understanding of the temporal immediacy of the wrongdoing, was likely insufficient, as
almost all participants clearly indicated when the wrongdoing in the scenario had already
taken place. This disparity between perception and response indicates that participants
were either uninterested in engaging authentically or were simply confused about what
responses would be most appropriate. In either case, the manipulation used in this study
was insufficient to provoke a high degree of variability in the dependent variables. From
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the myriad of potential reasons that this manipulation did not work, I have identified two
key constraints within the vignette method employed that are likely causes: the difficulty
in adequately capturing organizational misconduct, and the limits of creating situational
ambiguity. Whereas the broader limitations and remedies for this experimental paradigm
are discussed in the following future research section below, these critiques may inform
future researchers who wish to craft vignette manipulations that prompt more poignant
participant responses.
Capturing Organizational Misconduct with Vignettes
One of the most difficult aspects of crafting the manipulation used in this study
was the selection of the organizational misconduct featured in the scenarios. Whereas
past whistleblowing studies featuring vignette methods involved the exposure of
participants to multiple wrongdoing scenarios (detailed in the Manipulation and Measures
section), these approaches did not explore potential moderation effects. To explore the
potential moderating effects of personality traits, a single wrongdoing scenario was
needed in order to hold all else constant, with only a single variable manipulated to create
separate levels of wrongdoing.
Building upon this research, I chose to manipulate the temporal immediacy
(Singer et al., 1998; Jones, 1991) of the misconduct intended to elicit varying levels of
urgency experienced by participants to whistleblow. Altering the temporal immediacy of
the wrongdoing event allowed for the possibility of selecting any type of organizational
misconduct. I could then create different levels of urgency by manipulating when the
harm of the misconduct would occur. This approach also avoided additional
complications that could arise from asking participants to respond to an escalation of
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wrongdoing for which more complex legal precedents exist (e.g., presenting
misdemeanor wrongdoing versus felony wrongdoing). I intended to vary only the
temporal immediacy of the misconduct and keep everything else constant in the
scenarios, to preserve the construct validity of the situation. Unfortunately, varying
temporal immediacy was not effective in this study because participants did not perceive
the organizational wrongdoing in the current harm scenario as more severe than in the
future harm scenario. This indicates that the temporal immediacy was not apparent to
participants and that the participants did not interpret the manipulation in the way that I
intended.
Incorporating Situational Ambiguity
The second limitation of this manipulation was the difficulty in crafting scenarios
that featured varying levels of ambiguity. While attempting to replicate the conditions
that actual whistleblowers have faced in the past, I considered several factors that the
participant would need to evaluate. The first factor was when wrongdoing would occur,
as the essence of the manipulation involved varying the degree of temporal immediacy.
This meant that the participants would need to be able to clearly perceive when the
misconduct would occur. Secondly, one of the two scenarios in this study needed to
feature a high degree of ambiguity regarding the extent and timing of harm (i.e., future
harm scenario), while the other scenario was meant to leave participants with little doubt
as to what would occur. The creation of the future harm condition was an attempt to
replicate a level of ambiguity strong enough to allow for the observation of individual
differences in reporting responses (Beaty et al., 2001; Mischel, 1977). Furthermore, this
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approach was meant for the lower ambiguity scenario to serve as a control group in
which most participants were expected to respond similarly to the wrongdoing event.
The final factor that participants would need to consider was the potential
remedies for the wrongdoing described. This posed a unique challenge in this study, as
indicating a specific reporting route within the vignette reduces the overall ambiguity of
the scenario. Departing from the vignette procedure used by Andon and colleagues
(2018) which provided participants in both conditions with an explicit internal reporting
option, the vignettes used in this current investigation did not indicate a reporting route.
This was an attempt to simulate the confusion of a true whistleblowing event for
participants, yet it was not effective. Although the participants did rate the wrongdoing
detailed in both scenarios as quite serious, there were notably lackluster responses
concerning potential remedies for the wrongdoing. This may indicate that there was too
much ambiguity in the scenarios and participants did not know how to respond. Another
explanation may be that the participants simply lacked interest in the subject matter of the
scenarios and did not feel compelled to respond accurately.
These findings present a quandary for future researchers wanting to simulate a
real event using a vignette. Essentially, scenarios that are overly prescriptive and provide
a clear “right” choice for participants produce little insight. Conversely, absent direction
when faced with ambiguity in a scenario, participants may simply choose moderate
whistleblowing responses as was the case in this current study. Furthermore, there is an
inherent difficulty in selecting a scenario that will resonate with participants and elicit
meaningful, albeit hypothetical, responses. Distinguishing between honest confusion
attributable to a highly ambiguous scenario and the potential for participant fatigue and
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disinterest further underscores the difficulty of applying this methodology within a
whistleblowing context. These limitations further highlight the need for different
methodological approaches in future studies.
Future Research Directions
Building upon the lessons learned from the limits of the manipulation used in this
study, two distinct approaches emerged that may be able to better capture the internal
psychological processes through which individuals evaluate wrongdoing and choose to
respond. The first approach involves the further application of this experimental design
by shifting from the between-subjects approach used in this study and instead using a
with-in subject approach. This section also includes two brief recommendations for
researchers who choose to pursue study designs featuring whistleblowing vignettes. The
second approach I propose abandons the experiment method completely and instead
employs qualitative methods to assess the behavior of actual whistleblowers. Both of
these approaches are discussed in the sections below.
Within-subjects Approaches
Noting the limitations mentioned above within the vignette method employed in
this study, improvements could be made to the study design in subsequent research by
shifting to a within-subject approach. A focus on within-person responses to different
types of organizational misconduct may help to explain why the manipulation used in the
study did not produce significant mean differences between experimental conditions.
There are several advantages to this approach, such as increased power from fewer
participants, and an internal validity that is not completely dependent on random
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assignment (Charness et al., 2012). Applied within a whistleblowing context, this
approach allows a further degree of flexibility in selecting types of wrongdoing exposure.
For example, Robinson et al. (2012), used a within-subjects design to expose
participants to multiple types of fraud and theft. The authors noted that the benefit of this
method was that it featured an increased visibility of the manipulations by allowing the
comparison of multiple wrongdoing events to influence participant responses. However,
it should be noted that there are limitations to the number of events that a participant can
absorb without causing fatigue, and this may inform the future vignette-based research
designs (Weber, 1992). This risk may be mitigated through adequate pilot testing.
Nevertheless, this method may provide a higher degree of insight into the decision
making processes that participants employ when evaluating the seriousness of
wrongdoing for a given event. Should subsequent researchers use this approach in lieu of
a between-subject design, they may be able to better capture manipulation effects.
Using the Vignette Method for Whistleblowing Studies: Suggestions for Best
Practices. There are two key recommendations, informed by the difficulties with the
vignettes used in this study, that may be of use to researchers who choose to employ a
vignette method in the context of whistleblowing in the future. First, regardless of
whether a between-subject or within-subject design is used, it can be worthwhile to
consider the potential impact of the misconduct or wrongdoing selected for the scenario
and the ranges of responses that the scenario may invoke. When providing
recommendations for the creation of effective vignettes, Hughes and Huby (2004)
suggest, “vignettes are more likely to be effective when they engage participants’ interest,
are relevant to people’s lives, and appear real” (p. 40). When considering the use of
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vignettes within a whistleblowing context, the magnitude of the misconduct selected can
drastically influence subsequent reporting intentions. As was demonstrated in this current
study, the selection of a type of wrongdoing with similar scope and magnitude of the
Cambridge Analytica scandal, while clearly perceived as severe by participants, may
have been too unrealistic to be relevant for the average employee. Thus, future research
may be better served by using vignettes featuring more routine misconduct such as theft
or fraud, with less severe and overwhelming implications for society. This can allow
participants to better conceptualize the risk, albeit hypothetical, associated with their
preferred whistleblowing responses.
Second, the distinction between internal and external whistleblowing outcomes is
an important consideration when developing the vignette. Should a specific route be of
interest, the vignette may be crafted to exclude a certain reporting route. For example, if a
future researcher is solely focused on external whistleblowing intentions, they may
choose to provide a caveat within the vignette stating that internal reporting had already
been attempted unsuccessfully. However, there is also a risk associated with this
approach, as participants may perceive the scenario as more severe after learning of failed
internal reporting attempts. In this study, I choose to allow both reporting options but, as
was previously discussed, the preference for internal reporting may have been informed
in part by a participant inclination to attempt the internal reporting route first, before
engaging in the higher risk, external route. Future research efforts may be better served
by explicitly indicating the reporting route available to the participant within the vignette.
Qualitative Approaches
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The unique nature of the whistleblowing phenomenon presents vast opportunities
for researchers wanting to enhance existing behavioral theories under the constraint of
high pressure, high-risk situations. Thus, there are several benefits to pursuing nonexperimental approaches to explore a low-base rate phenomenon like whistleblowing.
Using qualitative or mixed-method approaches can ground the research within the
experiences of actual whistleblowing. Thus, any findings, no matter how minuscule, will
at the very least be attuned to the reality of the risk assumed by whistleblowers. This
approach can benefit policymakers and organizational leaders alike, as mechanisms
created to safeguard potential whistleblowers can better aligned to more effectively
combat organizational retaliation.
The extant methods used to assess whistleblowing intentions in nonwhistleblower populations are typically limited to survey and vignette approaches
(Bjørkelo & Bye, 2014). Although these approaches can provide varying degrees of
insight into the reporting intentions of a sample population, they may not be sufficient to
transcend the rift that exists between hypothetical scenarios and exposure to actual
organizational misconduct. This is noteworthy because there is evidence suggesting that
whistleblowing intentions do not necessarily lead to actual whistleblowing behavior
(Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). In a broader critique of such experimental
methodologies, Yarkoni (2019) stresses the limits of generalizability within experimental
findings as the valid inferences are limited only to the population tested. This critique is
fitting in a whistleblowing context as participants in experimental settings can respond to
manipulations and related survey measures without having to consider actual, personal
risk. It is also concerning that survey methods may only be allowed in “clean
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organizations” (i.e., organizations that have nothing to hide) and that participants with
insight into the organizational misconduct manipulated may self-select out, fearing
potential identification (Watts & Buckley, 2017; Miceli & Near, 1988).
Using qualitative or mixed-method approaches can amplify the uniqueness of a
whistleblowers experience within society. Hill et al. (2005) note that such qualitative
approaches, specifically consensual qualitative research, are ideally suited to explore
“events that are hidden from public view” (p. 23). Applying such approaches when
studying the whistleblowing phenomenon is fitting, as the modus operandi for many
corrupt organizations is to silence or suppress the whistleblower. Consequently, methods
that can elevate the unique stories of whistleblowers and detail the causal mechanism that
drove them to act, may lead to a deeper understanding of the phenomena and allow for
new aspects of the whistleblowing experience to emerge.
Another advantage in shifting to the qualitative approach is that conducting indepth interviews with actual whistleblowers can result in more fully capturing the
whistleblowing phenomenon and the numerous factors that can influence a given
whistleblower’s actions. This method can help researchers to continue building better
conceptualizations of the internal and external catalysts that prompt such unique, lowbase rate actions. An excellent example of the high degree of specificity and rich detail
that can be gained from a qualitative study of real whistleblowers is the work from Kenny
et al. (2019) who employed this methodology on a smaller scale to develop elaborate
descriptions of the impact of organizational retaliation on whistleblower mental health
from a sample of 22 actual whistleblowers. Another excelled example of this process
conducted on a much larger scale, is research from Vandekerckhove et al. (2013)
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evaluated a sample of one thousand callers to a confidential advice line. This approach
allowed for a wealth of information to be obtained and coded from a wide spectrum of
whistleblowers, providing tangible insights into actual whistleblower demographics,
decision making processes, and perceived organizational responses. These studies
provide a strong, current support for the continued application of non-experimental
designs to capture the unique experiences of whistleblowers.
Conclusion
While conducting this study over the past year, numerous additional
whistleblowing events have occurred. These whistleblowers have emerged both in the US
and around the world and have chosen both intern and external methods of reporting.
These whistleblowers have had an unprecedented level of impact, from the anonymous
intelligence official whose actions led to the impeachment of the US president (Kohn,
Kohn, & Colapinto, 2019), to the Boeing official who raised safety concerns about airline
platform malfunctions that resulted in tragedies across the globe (Gelles, 2020). Most
recently, Dr. Li Wenliang, now deceased, faced retaliation from the Chinese Government
after blowing the whistle on the pandemic COVID-19 virus emergence (Kuo, 2020).
These brave efforts, despite relentless and highly visible institutional backlashes, have
exposed rampant organizational wrongdoing and corruption. Continued research pursuits
to determine methods of better identifying, empowering, and protecting the welfare of
future whistleblowers is not only justified but is of vital necessity for global wellbeing.
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APPENDIX A: Figures
Figure 1
Model of Hypothesized Relationships
Predictor: Harm
occurrence from
organizational
misconduct

Outcomes:
Whistleblowing
likelihood

Condition 1
• Misconduct resulting in
future harm. (low
urgency)

Likelihood to report the
misconduct through either:

Condition 2
• Misconduct resulting in
current harm (high
urgency)

Moderator: Personality
of potential
whistleblower

•

Agreeableness (high
levels will weaken the
relationship)

•

Conscientiousness (high
levels will strengthen
the relationship)

•

Internal whistleblowing

•

External whistleblowing
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Figure 2

Whistleblowing Likelihood

Proposed Moderating Role of Agreeableness

Low
Agreeableness
High
Agreeableness

Future Harm

Current Harm

Note. Graph of the proposed moderating role of agreeableness in the effect of the timing
of harm on whistleblowing likelihood.
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Figure 3

Whistleblowing Likelihood

Proposed Moderating Role of Conscientiousness

Low
Conscientiousness

High
Conscientiousness

Future Harm

Current Harm

Note. Graph of the proposed moderating role of conscientiousness in the effect of the
timing of harm on whistleblowing likelihood.
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APPENDIX B: Tables
Table 1
Overview of measures
Construct
Measure Name
(use)
(# of items)
Organizational
Organizational
Misconduct
Misconduct
(Manipulation)
Vignettes
(2 descriptions)
Manipulation
Observation of
Check
Wrongdoing
(Reading
(1 items)
Comprehension)

Citation for
Measure
N/A

Scale

N/A

Yes/No Forced
Choice

N/A

10-point
sliding scale
1 (no
wrongdoing)
to 10 (severe
wrongdoing);
1 (no harm) to
10 (high level
of harm)
5-point Likert
scale
1 (strongly
disagree) to 5
(strongly
agree)
5-point Likert
scale
1 (strongly
disagree) to 5
(strongly
agree)
5-point Likert
scale
1 (strongly
disagree) to 5
(strongly
agree)

N/A

Manipulation
Check
(Comprehension)

Observation of
Wrongdoing
(2 items)

N/A

Personality
(Moderator)

Big Five
Inventory
(60 items)

Soto & John
(2017)

Cultural
Orientation
(Exploratory)

Cultural
Orientation
Questionnaire
(10 items)

Park et al.
(2008)

Whistleblowing
Attitudes
(Outcome)

Whistleblowing
Attitudes
(14 items)

Park et al.
(2008)

N/A

Data
Preparation
N/A

Composite
Score

Composite
Score

Composite
Score
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News
Consumption
(Exploratory)

Media/News
Consumption
Question
(1 item)

N/A

Political
Orientation
(Exploratory)

Political
Orientation
Question
(1 item)

Haidt &
Graham
(2007)

Demographics
(Analysis)

(7 items)

N/A

10-point
sliding scale
1 (does not
consume any
news) to 10
(daily news
consumption)
7-point Likert
scale
1 (extremely
conservative)
to 7
(extremely
liberal)
N/A

N/A

N/A
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Table 2
Demographic characteristics of participants across all study conditions.
Characteristic
n
%
Age
18-29
109
44.7
30-39
71
29.0
40-49
41
16.8
50-59
18
7.4
60+
5
2.0
Gender
Male
115
46.0
Female
132
52.8
Prefer Not to Say
3
1.2
Ethnic Heritage
American Indian or Alaska Native
1
0.4
Asian
17
6.8
Black / African American
14
5.6
Hispanic or Latino/a
26
10.4
White or Caucasian
180
72.0
Multi-Racial
11
4.4
Prefer not to say
1
0.4
Principal Industry of Participant
Organization*
Education
29
11.6
Banking/Finance/Accounting
10
4.0
Medical/Dental/Healthcare
18
7.2
Wholesale/Retail/Distribution
24
9.6
Marketing/Advertising/Entertainment
16
6.4
Business Services/Consultant
14
5.6
Other/Not Listed
96
38.4
Years of Professional Experience
0-10
172
69.3
11-20
52
21.0
21+
24
9.6
Participant Organizational Size
0
52
20.8
1-50
90
36.0
51-500
49
19.6
501-2000
18
7.2
2000+
41
16.4
Note. * Participant industry affiliations of 4% or higher across all participants were
included in this table.
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Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, Internal Consistencies, and Correlations
Measure
M
SD
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
1. Age
33.42
11.24
2. Sex1
0.53
0.50
.14*
2
3. Harm Occurrence
0.50
0.50
.02
-.09
4. Perceived Severity
8.00
2.23
.04
.15*
-.02
5. Perceived Harm
6.64
2.81
.02
.12
-.01
.63**
6. Internal WB
3.69
1.11
.14*
.00
-.03
.09
.03
(.93)
7. External WB
3.37
1.00
-.05
.04
-.03
.34**
.40**
.01
(.79)
**
**
8. Agreeableness
3.70
0.61
.17
.11
.06
.12
.08
.19
.04
(.84)
9. Conscientiousness
3.55
0.74
.30**
.17**
.03
.10
.10
.23**
.05
.43** (.90)
10. News Consumption
6.06
2.83
.20**
.03
-.02
.19**
.18**
.15*
.24**
.01
.17**
**
*
**
**
11. Political Orientation
4.92
1.55
-.17
.11
.02
.16
.21
-.02
.20
-.04
-.21**
.14*
1
2
Note. N = 250. Sex is coded 0 = Male, 1 = Female. Three participants preferred not to indicate their gender. Harm occurrence is coded 0 = Future
Harm Scenario, 1 = Current Harm Scenario. * p < .05 level (2-tailed). ** p < .01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 4
Preliminary Analysis: Regression Analysis for Perception of Severity and Perception of Harm Predicting both Internal and External
Whistleblowing
Internal Whistleblowing
External Whistleblowing
2
Variable
B
SE
t
p
R
B
SE
t
p
R2
Model Summary
.009
.16**
Perception of Severity
0.06
0.04
1.41
.16
.08
.03
2.38
.02*
Perception of Harm
-0.02
0.03
-0.57
.57
.09
.03
3.42
.001**
Overall F
1.08
23.04**
Note. N = 250. SE = standard error. * p < .05 level (2-tailed). ** p < .01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 5
Primary Analysis: Regression Analysis Summary for Agreeableness as a Moderator of the Relationship Between Vignette
Scenarios and both Internal and External Whistleblowing
Internal Whistleblowing
External Whistleblowing
Variable
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
Model Summary
.04*
.003
Constant
3.69
0.07
53.42
.00
3.37
0.06 53.08
.00
Harm Occurrence
-0.09
0.14
-0.65
-.36
-0.06
0.12 -0.48
.63
**
Agreeableness
0.34
0.11
3.03
.003
0.07
0.11 0.67
.50
Harm Occurrence*Agreeableness
-0.14
0.23
-0.61
.54
-0.07
0.21 -0.34
.73
Overall F
3.23*
0.25
Note. N = 250. SE = standard error. Harm occurrence is coded 0 = Future Harm and 1 = Current Harm. * p < .05 level (2-tailed).
** p < .01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 6
Primary Analysis: Regression Analysis Summary for Conscientiousness as a Moderator of the Relationship Between Vignette
Scenarios and both Internal and External Whistleblowing
Internal Whistleblowing
External Whistleblowing
Variable
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
Model Summary
0.05**
.004
Constant
3.69
0.07
53.86
.00
3.37
0.06 53.16
.00
Harm Occurrence
-0.07
0.14
-0.56
.57
-0.06
0.13 -0.46
.64
Conscientiousness
0.34
0.09
3.63
<.001**
0.07
0.09
0.79
.43
Harm Occurrence*Conscientiousness
0.04
0.19
0.23
.82
-0.03
0.17 -0.15
.88
Overall F
4.49**
0.29
Note. N = 250. SE = standard error. Harm occurrence is coded 0 = Future Harm and 1 = Current Harm. * p < .05 level (2-tailed).
** p < .01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 7
Exploratory Analysis: Regression Analysis Summary for Extraversion as a Moderator of the Relationship Between Vignette
Scenarios and both Internal and External Whistleblowing
Internal Whistleblowing
External Whistleblowing
Variable
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
Model Summary
.05**
.005
Constant
3.69
0.07
53.86
.00
3.37
0.06 53.19
.00
Harm Occurrence
-0.07
0.14
-0.55
.58
-0.06
0.13 -0.46
.64
Extraversion
0.35
0.09
3.65
<.001**
0.09
0.09
0.99
.32
Harm Occurrence*Extraversion
0.05
0.19
0.25
.80
0.02
0.18
0.13
.90
Overall F
4.53**
0.40
Note. N = 250. SE = standard error. Harm occurrence is coded 0 = Future Harm and 1 = Current Harm. * p < .05 level (2-tailed).
** p < .01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 8
Exploratory Analysis: Regression Analysis Summary for Open Mindedness as a Moderator of the Relationship Between Vignette
Scenarios and both Internal and External Whistleblowing
Internal Whistleblowing
External Whistleblowing
Variable
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
Model Summary
.02
.06**
Constant
3.69
0.07
53.12
.00
3.37
0.06 54.74
.00
Harm Occurrence
-0.05
0.14
-0.36
.72
-0.03
0.12 -0.25
.81
Open Mindedness
0.20
0.11
1.89
.05*
0.38
0.10
4.01
<.001**
Harm Occurrence*Open Mindedness
0.32
0.22
1.49
.14
0.01
0.19
0.03
.98
Overall F
2.04
5.42
Note. N = 250. SE = standard error. Harm occurrence is coded 0 = Future Harm and 1 = Current Harm. * p < .05 level (2-tailed). ** p <
.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 9
Exploratory Analysis: Regression Analysis Summary for Negative Emotionality as a Moderator of the Relationship Between
Vignette Scenarios and both Internal and External Whistleblowing
Internal Whistleblowing
External Whistleblowing
Variable
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
Model Summary
.05**
.003
Constant
3.69
0.07
53.69
.00
3.37
0.06 53.04
.00
Harm Occurrence
-0.09
0.14
-0.67
.50
-0.06
0.13 -0.46
.64
Negative Emotionality (NE)
-0.29
0.08
-3.52
<.001**
-0.03
0.08 -0.43
.67
Harm Occurrence*NE
-0.06
0.17
-0.37
.71
-0.09
0.15 -0.61
.54
Overall F
4.22**
0.24
Note. N = 250. SE = standard error. Harm occurrence is coded 0 = Future Harm and 1 = Current Harm. * p < .05 level (2-tailed).
** p < .01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 10
Exploratory Analysis: Regression Analysis Summary for News Consumption as a Moderator of the Relationship Between Vignette
Scenarios and both Internal and External Whistleblowing
Internal Whistleblowing
External Whistleblowing
Variable
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
Model Summary
.03
.06**
Constant
3.68
0.07
52.86
.00
3.37 0.06
54.58
.00
Harm Occurrence
-0.05
0.14
-0.33
.74
-0.05 0.12
-0.41
.68
News Consumption
0.06
0.02
2.30
.02*
0.08 0.02
3.85
<.001**
Harm Occurrence*News Consumption 0.06
0.05
1.26
.21
-0.01 0.04
-0.22
.83
Overall F
2.33
5.04**
Note. N = 250. SE = standard error. Harm occurrence is coded 0 = Future Harm and 1 = Current Harm. * p < .05 level (2-tailed). ** p <
.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 11
Exploratory Analysis: Regression Analysis Summary for Political Orientation as a Moderator of the Relationship Between Vignette
Scenario and both Internal and External Whistleblowing
Internal Whistleblowing
External Whistleblowing
Variable
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
Model Summary
.004
.04**
Constant
3.69 0.07
52.54
.00
3.37
0.06
54.22
.00
Harm Occurrence
-0.06 0.14
-0.45
.65
-0.06
0.12
-0.51
.61
Political Orientation
-0.01 0.05
-0.26
.80
0.12
0.04
3.07
.002**
Harm Occurrence*Political Orientation
0.08 0.09
0.85
.39
0.09
0.08
1.07
.28
Overall F
0.33
3.66**
Note. N = 250. SE = standard error. Harm occurrence is coded 0 = Future Harm and 1 = Current Harm. * p < .05 level (2-tailed). ** p < .01
level (2-tailed).
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Table 12
Exploratory Analysis: Regression Analysis Summary for Agreeableness as a Moderator of the Relationship Between Vignette Scenarios
and both Internal and External Whistleblowing, with News Consumption and Political Orientation as Covariates
Internal Whistleblowing
External Whistleblowing
Variable
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
Model Summary
.05**
.09**
Constant
3.42
0.26
13.06
.00
2.35
0.23
10.14
.00
Harm Occurrence
-0.07
0.14
-0.53
.60
-0.06
0.12
-0.50
.62
Agreeableness
0.33
0.12
2.88
.004**
0.06
0.10
0.58
.56
Harm Occurrence*Agreeableness
-0.13
0.23
-0.55
.58
-0.01
0.20
-0.03
.98
News Consumption (covariate)
0.06
0.02
2.33
.02*
0.08
0.02
3.45
<.001**
Political Orientation (covariate)
-0.02
0.05
-0.37
.71
0.12
0.04
2.85
.004**
**
**
Overall F
2.83
4.79
Note. N = 250. SE = standard error. Harm occurrence is coded 0 = Future Harm and 1 = Current Harm. * p < .05 level (2-tailed). ** p < .01
level (2-tailed).
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Table 13
Exploratory Analysis: Regression Analysis Summary for Conscientiousness as a Moderator of the Relationship Between Vignette
Scenarios and both Internal and External Whistleblowing, with News Consumption and Political Orientation as Covariates
Internal Whistleblowing
External Whistleblowing
Variable
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
B
SE
t
p
∆R2
Model Summary
.06**
.09**
Constant
3.35
0.26
12.83
.00
2.33
0.23
10.08
.00
Harm Occurrence
-0.06
0.14
-0.46
.64
-0.06
0.12
-0.49
.63
Conscientiousness
0.31
0.10
3.16
.002**
0.07
0.09
0.75
.45
Harm Occurrence*Conscientiousness
0.04
0.19
0.22
.83
-0.02
0.17
-0.15
.88
News Consumption (covariate)
0.04
0.03
1.65
.10
0.07
0.02
3.23
.001**
Political Orientation (covariate)
0.02
0.05
0.35
.73
0.12
0.04
2.94
.004**
**
**
Overall F
3.14
4.85
Note. N = 250. SE = standard error. Harm occurrence is coded 0 = Future Harm and 1 = Current Harm. * p < .05 level (2-tailed). ** p <
.01 level (2-tailed).
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Table 14
Exploratory Analysis: Regression Analysis for all Big Five Traits Predicting both Internal and External Whistleblowing
Internal Whistleblowing
External Whistleblowing
2
Variable
B
SE
t
p
R
B
SE
t
p
R2
Model Summary
.09**
.06*
Agreeableness
0.12
0.13
0.97
.33
-0.05
0.12
-0.39
.69
Conscientiousness
0.14
0.11
1.27
.21
0.01
0.10
0.12
.90
Extraversion
0.19
0.11
1.77
.08
0.002 0.10
0.02
.98
Open Mindedness
0.10
0.11
0.87
.39
0.39
0.10
3.86
<.001**
Negative Emotionality
-0.13
0.10
-1.28
.20
-0.02
0.09
-0.21
.83
Overall F
4.78**
3.25*
Note. N = 250. SE = standard error. * p < .05 level (2-tailed). ** p < .01 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX C: Measures

Political
Orientation

Measurement/
Questionnaire Name
Organizational
Wrongdoing Vignettes
Observation of
Wrongdoing
Whistleblowing
Attitudes and Cultural
Orientation
Questionnaire
Whistleblowing
Attitudes and Cultural
Orientation
Questionnaire
Big Five Inventory
(BFI-2)
Media/News
Consumption Question
Political Orientation
Question

Demographics

N/A

Construct
Organizational
Wrongdoing
Manipulation
Check
Whistleblowing
Likelihood

Cultural Orientation

Personality
News Consumption

Citation for
Measure
Developed for this
study
Developed for this
study
Park, Blenkinsopp,
Oktem, &
Omurgonulsen
(2008)
Park, Blenkinsopp,
Oktem, &
Omurgonulsen
(2008)

# of Items in
the Measure
2
descriptions

Soto & John (2017)

60 items

Developed for this
study
Haidt & Graham
(2007)
N/A

3 items

14 items

10 items

1 item
1 item
7 items
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Vignettes
*Please note that each participant will only be assigned one vignette
Directions: Please read the following scenario carefully and respond to the
questions below.
Vignette #1
You have worked as data analyst for a large social media company for the past
two years. One evening before leaving for the day, you find a memo left in a
printer tray. The memo describes an upcoming transfer of private user information
between your company and a foreign research group that your company has
worked with in the past.
The memo also suggests that the foreign research group wants to use this
information to make political advertisements to influence the outcome of the 2020
election cycle. You note that the transfer of information will occur in one
week.

Vignette #2
You have worked as data analyst for a large social media company for the past
two years. One evening before leaving for the day, you find a memo left in a
printer tray. The memo describes a transfer of private user information between
your company and a foreign research group that your company has worked with
in the past.
The memo also suggests that the foreign research group wants to use this
information to make political advertisements to influence the outcome of the 2020
election cycle. You note that the transfer of information occurred one week
ago.
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Comprehension Check (after each vignette)
Item
1
Has your company
transferred the user
information yet?

Yes

No

Manipulation Check (after each vignette; note that a 1-10 point sliding bar is
provided for each question)
Item
1

Please indicate the
extent to which you
feel that the
wrongdoing
described in the
scenario was
severe.

Item
1

No
wrongdoing
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Severe
wrongdoing
10

9

High level
of harm
10

No harm
Please indicate the
extent to which you
feel that there is
current harm to
people in the
scenario.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8
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Scales
Personality – Big Five (Soto & John, 2017)
Directions: Please read each statement carefully and indicate the extent of your
agreement with it.
Item
Strongly Disagree
Neither
Agree Strongly
disagree
agree or
agree
disagree
1
I am someone who
1
2
3
4
5
is outgoing,
sociable.
2
I am someone who
1
2
3
4
5
is compassionate,
has a soft heart.
3
I am someone who
1
2
3
4
5
tends to be
disorganized.
4
I am someone who
1
2
3
4
5
is relaxed, handles
stress well.
5
I am someone who
1
2
3
4
5
has few artistic
interests.
6
I am someone who
1
2
3
4
5
has an assertive
personality.
7
I am someone who
1
2
3
4
5
is respectful, treats
others with respect.
8
I am someone who
1
2
3
4
5
tends to be lazy.
9
I am someone who
1
2
3
4
5
stays optimistic
after experiencing a
setback.
10 I am someone who
1
2
3
4
5
is curious about
many different
things.
11 I am someone who
1
2
3
4
5
rarely feels excited
or eager.
12 I am someone who
1
2
3
4
5
tends to find fault
with others.
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13

14

15

16
17

18

19
20

21

22

23

24

25

I am someone who
is dependable,
steady.
I am someone who
Is moody, has up
and down mood
swings.
I am someone who
is inventive, finds
clever ways to do
things.
I am someone who
tends to be quiet.
I am someone who
feels little
sympathy for
others.
I am someone who
is systematic, likes
to keep things in
order.
I am someone who
can be tense.
I am someone who
is fascinated by art,
music, or literature.
I am someone who
is dominant, acts as
a leader.
I am someone who
starts arguments
with others.
I am someone who
has difficulty
getting started on
tasks.
I am someone who
feels secure,
comfortable with
self.
I am someone who
avoids intellectual,
philosophical
discussions.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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26

27

28

29

30
31

32

33

34
35

36

37

38

39
40

41

I am someone who
is less active than
other people.
I am someone who
has a forgiving
nature.
I am someone who
can be somewhat
careless.
I am someone who
is emotionally
stable, not easily
upset.
I am someone who
has little creativity.
I am someone who
Is sometimes shy,
introverted.
I am someone who
is helpful and
unselfish with
others.
I am someone who
keeps things neat
and tidy.
I am someone who
worries a lot.
I am someone who
values art and
beauty.
I am someone who
finds it hard to
influence people.
I am someone who
is sometimes rude
to others.
I am someone who
is efficient, gets
things done.
I am someone who
often feels sad.
I am someone who
is complex, a deep
thinker.
I am someone who
is full of energy.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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42

43

44

45

46
47

48

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

I am someone who
is suspicious of
others’ intentions.
I am someone who
is reliable, can
always be counted
on.
I am someone who
keeps their
emotions under
control.
I am someone who
has difficulty
imagining things.
I am someone who
is talkative.
I am someone who
can be cold and
uncaring.
I am someone who
leaves a mess,
doesn’t clean up.
I am someone who
rarely feels anxious
or afraid.
I am someone who
thinks poetry and
plays are boring.
I am someone who
prefers to have
others take charge.
I am someone who
is polite, courteous
to others.
I am someone who
is persistent, works
until the task is
finished.
I am someone who
tends to feel
depressed, blue.
I am someone who
has little interest in
abstract Ideas.

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5
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56

I am someone who
shows a lot of
enthusiasm.
I am someone who
assumes the best
about people.
I am someone who
sometimes behaves
irresponsibly.
I am someone who
is temperamental,
gets emotional
easily.
I am someone who
is original, comes
up with new ideas.

57

58

59

60

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

News/Media Consumption (note that a 1-10 point sliding bar is provided for this
question)
Directions: Please indicate your level of news consumption.
Item
I do not
follow
any
news
reporting
1

Please
indicate the
extent to
which you
follow
national and
political
news
reporting.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

I follow
news
reporting
on a
daily
basis
10

9

Political Orientation Question - Haidt & Graham (2007)
Directions: Please indicate your political orientation.
Extremely
Conservative
Somewhat
Moderate
Conservative
Conservative
1

2

3

4

Somewhat
Liberal

Liberal

Extremely
Liberal

5

6

7
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Demographics
Directions: What is your age?

Directions: What is your sex?
Male
Female
Prefer Not to Say
Directions: What best represents your racial or ethnic heritage?
American Indian or Alaska Native
Asian
Black / African American
Hispanic or Latino/a
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander
White or Caucasian
Multi-Racial
Other
Prefer not to say
Directions: What is the principal industry of your organization? (Drop Down Menu)
Education
Banking/Finance/Accounting
Insurance/Real Estate/Legal
Federal Government (including military)
State/Local Government
Medical/Dental/Healthcare
Transportation/Utilities
Construction/Architecture/Engineering
Manufacturing/Process Industries
Online Retailer
Aerospace
Wholesale/Retail/Distribution
Research/Development Lab
Marketing/Advertising/Entertainment
Business Services/Consultant
Other/Not Listed
Directions: How many years of
professional experience do you have?

Directions: Including yourself, how many people are employed at your organization in all locations?
(Drop Down Menu)
1-50
51-500
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501-2000
2000+
Don’t know
Directions: Approximately what is your household income?
$0 - $9,999
$10,000 - $19,999
$20,000 - $29,999
$30,000 - $39,999
$40,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $59,999
$60,000 - $69,999
$70,000 - $79,999
$80,000 - $89,999
$90,000 - $99,999
$100,000 - $149,999
$150,000 or more
Prefer not to say

